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I. INTRODUCTION
Marriage as we know it in America is undergoing rigor-
ous re-examination and even hostile attack in the last third
of the twentieth century in part because of the doubt ex-
pressed in some quarters that this venerable institution
meets the psychological and sociological needs of the mass
of men and women.'
And since, as one wag has put it, marriage is the "cause"
of divorce,' one can expect great ferment in the area of di-
vorce law as well. Such is in fact the case. The legislatures,
the prime source of divorce law, after a period of neglect
sometimes going back to the revolutionary period, 3 are begin-
ning to explore and occasionally enact legislation which is
moving the law from quasi-tort (fault) theory4 toward a con-
cept embracing the dissolution of a partnership when the
partners are temperamentally incapable of making a success
of the enterprise.'
' Going beyond theoretical academic discussion of the need for radical reform
of the marriage institution, two Maryland legislators introduced a bill in the 1972
legislative session which would have substituted for the standard life-time marriage
contract a fixed term contract with mutual options to extend the contract at the
end of the fixed term. See J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 96 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as BERNARD]; Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and Prob-
lems of Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 649, 661-63 (1972).
2 This anonymous wag's exact words are: "Hurrah! I have just found the solu-
tion. Yes, I have delved to the very source and now I can tell you that 'marriage' is
the principal cause of divorce." Tilton, Lawyer's Strategy in Matrimonial Law,
That this poet may be more accurate in his appraisal of the cause of divorce, see
BERNARD, supra note 1, which suggests that marriage as an institution is a positive
cause of unhappiness in a majority of women who indulge in it.
I In 1787 New York recognized absolute divorce (divorce a viniculo) on the sole
ground of adultery. It was not until 1966 that the legislature increased the number
of grounds for which an absolute divorce could be obtained in New York. M.
PAULSEN, M. PARKER, W. WADLINGTON, & J. GOEBEL, DOMEsTIc RELATIONS, CASES
AND MATERIALS 415 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PAULSEN]; N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
' See H. CLARK, JR., DOMESTIC RELATIONS 284 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].
' Dissolution of marriage in California under the new Family Law Act is a
business-like transaction. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1971). As one
divorcee complained, the proceedings seemed "too impersonal and coldblooded."
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, at 62, cols. 1-6. On the other hand, the judges handling
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But even though change appears to be the order of the
day, there is presently no real national consensus as to the
form that change should take. Many legislative approaches
have been suggested in an effort to modify or eliminate the
fault principle. These will be explored at length in this arti-
cle, and their strengths and weaknesses will be emphasized.
In addition, the effects of the new legislation on the parties,
the individual judges and lawyers involved, and the bar will
be discussed. In the course of this discussion of the ferment
in divorce law the authors have not hesitated to state their
own preferences and their reasons therefor.
For the discussion of new legislative approaches to di-
vorce to be meaningful to the reader unfamiliar with divorce
law, an historical and contemporary matrix is provided.
A. A SHORT OUTLINE OF DIVORCE IN AMERICA'
Both English and American divorce law have been pro-
foundly affected by the view of the Roman Catholic church
that the marital rites are a sacrament and indissoluble ex-
cept upon death of one of the parties.7 This sacramental
theory of marriage provided the Church with a basis for
claiming exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce in
its ecclesiastical courts in England. The common law courts
did not dispute this secular jurisdiction even after Henry
VIII's break with Rome. The Church of England simply took
over administration of the ecclesiastical courts. Throughout
their history, with but one short break in the late sixteenth
century, these courts refused to grant divorce a viniculo (ab-
"dissolution" cases welcome the change. San Diego Superior Court Judge William
A. Yale is quoted as saying, "Instead of screaming and name-calling, we have a
business proposition that goes off fairly simply." Id.
I This outline is based on materials found in CLARK, supra note 4, at 281-85;
J. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 256-61 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
MADDEN]; PAULSEN, supra note 3, at 416-19; M. PLoscowE & D. FREED, FAMILY LAW
133-44 (1st ed. 1963); Weinstein, Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce, 27 Mo.
L. REv. 307, 314-20 (1962); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury,
52 VA. L. REv. 33, 35-39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wadlington].




solute dissolution of an existing valid marriage).' They did
decree divorce a mensa et thoro (physical separation from
bed and board) for the severe marital offenses of adultery
and physical cruelty.9 Without a showing of such great fault
one could not even obtain a judicial separation.
But in the late seventeenth century adultery did provide
a basis for the wealthy nobleman to obtain an absolute di-
vorce from his wife (but rarely vice versa). Armed with a
divorce decree a mensa et thoro from an ecclesiastical court
together with evidence of the successful prosecution of the
wife's paramour for criminal conversation, the influential
citizen could obtain a "legislative" divorce by private bill.
The development of divorce law was somewhat different
in the American colonies. They were in large part settled by
Protestants and no ecclesiastical courts were established.
The common law courts with no inherited jurisdiction in the
field of marriage and divorce made no effort to fill the vac-
uum. Thus it fell to the colonial legislatures and governors
to provide for some form of divorce, be it a viniculo or a
mensa et thoro. Because the Protestant view that marriage
was a civil contract and not a sacrament was dominant in
the colonies, legislative divorce became somewhat easier to
obtain in pre-revolutionary America. However, the fault con-
cept was retained.
Following the Revolution, the now independent legisla-
tures had three major options available to them as suggested
by the English experience. They could provide for jurisdic-
tion in the local courts, or provide for legislative divorce by
private bill, or provide for a combination of these two alter-
natives. In addition, each legislature had to decide for itself
which grounds would be recognized. These options led to
Their jurisdiction over marriage and divorce was finally ended by the Matri-
monial Causes Act of 1857 which gave jurisdiction to grant divorces a viniculo to a
civil court, at that time called the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. See
MADDEN, supra note 6, at 256-59; Rye v. Fuljamb, Moore 683 (1601); 3 Salkeld 138.
1 Annulment of a marriage might also be obtained from the ecclesiastical
courts because of impediments to a valid marriage ab initio, e.g., incest or lack of
real consent. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 4, at 119.
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great variation in divorce law from one state to another and
later created disparities among the new territories. The
hodgepodge of approaches to divorce in America was fur-
ther compounded by the division between those states which
accepted the substantive law developed by the ecclesiastical
courts as part of the common law of England and those states
which did not. 0 However, even in those states which rejected
the ecclesiastical law, the concept was accepted that very
specific fault grounds were required before an absolute or
limited divorce could be granted."
In the nineteenth century, legislative divorce was dis-
carded because of the ill repute into which it had fallen,
occasioned by high costs, fraud, bribery of legislators and
often the failure to give the spouse against whom the divorce
was sought notice and hearing.12 Courts of equity were then
given exclusive jurisdiction by the legislatures to grant abso-
lute and limited divorces, 3 though the legislative branch
continued to prescribe the grounds for divorce and the requi-
site procedures.
During the late nineteenth and the first half of the twen-
tieth centuries, legislative action led to an increase in the
number of fault grounds recognized by various of the Ameri-
can jurisdictions and the authorization of alimony, property
,0 New York, for instance, rejected the law of divorce administered by the
ecclesiastical courts. Missouri, on the other hand, accepted that body of substantive
law except as modified by statute. See Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopkins 557 (N.Y. 1825);
Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 666-70, 192 S.W. 448, 449-50 (1917); Stokes
v. Stokes, 1 Mo. 320 (1823); Weinstein, Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce,
27 Mo. L. REv. 307, 317 (1962).
1 New York is the prime example. While refusing to accept the ecclesiastical
body of law, it provided in its first statute that absolute divorce could only be
obtained for the ultimate marital offense, adultery. See PAULSEN, supra note 3, at
418.
,2 See 3 T. HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 31-50, 96-101
(1904); CLARK, supra note 4, at 284; 1 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 2-5,
(1945).
,1 One exception was South Carolina where the courts were given no jurisdic-
tion to grant absolute divorce until 1949 when a constitutional amendment was
ratified which permitted absolute divorce on four grounds; adultery, desertion,
physical cruelty or habitual drunkeness. Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 505-07, 56
S.E.2d 330, 332-33 (1949). See 2 C. VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS 3 (Table 27)
(1932) [hereinafter cited as VERNIER].
520 [Vol. 12
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division, child support and child custody orders. These col-
lateral orders were also made subject to considerations of
fault.
B. THE FAULT DIVORCE SYSTEM IN GENERAL
While this brief history indicates that the grounds for
divorce and the defenses to a divorce action will vary from
state to state, one can look at one or two fault jurisdictions
and make some fairly safe generalizations as to the fault
system across the United States. 4 The authors have chosen
to generalize from the experience of Missouri 5 and to make
footnote comparisons to the District of Columbia because of
their greater familiarity with the laws of these two jurisdic-
tions.
Residence of the plaintiff (the equivalent of domicile) is
required to confer divorce jurisdiction upon a Missouri Cir-
cuit Court (the court of general jurisdiction)." While the
period of residence required can vary widely, 7 Missouri's
normal one-year period is typical. 8 In addition to alleging
compliance with the jurisdictional requirement, the plaintiff
" This conclusion, we think, is supported by the tables painstakingly con-
structed by Professor Chester G. Vernier and included in his monumental work,
American Family Laws, published in 1932. See especially Tables 27 through 39.
VERNIER, supra note 13, at 3-91.
"s Professor Zuckman is a co-reviser of the Missouri Bar's continuing legal
education handbook, Missouri Family Law (rev. ed. 1970), and has taught family
law at Saint Louis University School of Law and the Columbus School of Law of
the Catholic University of America.
" Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.050 (1959); Grant v. Grant, 324 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.
1959); MIssouRI FAMILY LAW 199-200 (rev. ed. 1970). Compare D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-902 (1967). Residence is an almost universal requirement in the Ameri-
can jurisdictions. See VERNIER, supra note 13, at 108-12. In fact, there is considera-
ble doubt whether a divorce decree unsupported by domicile of one or the other of
the parties is constitutionally permissible. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1953), judgment vacated, 345 U.S. 610 (1954); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73,
36 So. 2d 236 (1948). But cf. Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127
(1954); Wallace v. Wallace, 62 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
11 Compare, e.g., with Wisconsin, 2 years, Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 247.06 (Supp.
1972); North Carolina, 6 months, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (Supp. 1971); Nevada, 6
weeks, NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020(e) (1969).
11 Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.050 (1959). See VERNIER, supra note 13, at 108-12. The
District of Columbia also required a one-year wait but the residence for the period
may be that of the plaintiff or respondent. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-902 (1967).
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LA W
in his or her petition must include allegations of one or more
of eleven fault grounds for divorce and his or her own inno-
cence of marital fault. 9 The grounds recognized by Missouri
include those of adultery, desertion and cruelty. The cruelty
alleged must be such as to endanger the life of the innocent
spouse. But Missouri does recognize less severe mental cru-
elty over a period of time in the form of "general indignities,"
the ground most often chosen by divorcing spouses."0
Some of the minor divorce grounds recognized are more
appropriately ones for annulment since they represent
impediments to the initial contracting of a valid marriage.
These are: impotency at the time of marriage, the existence
of a prior undissolved marriage of one of the spouses, convic-
tion of a felony without the knowledge of the other spouse
and the wife's pregnancy by another man at the time of
marriage without the husband's knowledge. This mixing of
the concepts of divorce and annulment by the legislature is
quite common.'
Having made the required allegations, the spouse seek-
ing the divorce bears the burden of proving the defendant
spouse's guilt of marital fault and his or her own freedom
from marital offense. 2 The defendant spouse may deny that
any ground for divorce exists or that the complaining spouse
" See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.010 (1959); Aschemeyer, A Survey of Some As-
pects of Missouri Divorce Law, 27 Mo. L. REv. 333, 334-44, 351 (1962); R. DAWSON,
Missou FAmILY LAW 205-06 (rev. ed. 1970).
2 The indignities complained of must involve a continuous course of conduct
connoting settled hate, manifest alienation and estrangement and consisting of
unmerited contemptuous conduct, incivility or injury accompanied with insult and
amounting to a species of mental cruelty. Politte v. Politte, 230 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.
1950); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 224 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1949). See MIssouRI FAMILY LAW,
supra note 19, at 205, for examples of what do and do not constitute general indigni-
ties. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904 (1967) which makes cruelty a ground only
for limited divorce in the District of Columbia. Purely mental suffering is not
enough to obtain even limited divorce in the District of Columbia. The complaining
spouse must also show that the cruelty in whatever form resulted in injury to his
or her health. See Kimmell v. Kimmell, 171 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Ogden v.
Ogden, 17 App. D.C. 104 (1900).
" See VERNIER, supra note 13, at 3-4, 38-48, Tables 27, 32, 33.
" See, e.g., J. v. K., 419 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); L. v. N., 326 S.W.2d
751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Pointer v. Pointer, 251 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
[Vol. 12
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is free from marital fault and may produce evidence to sup-
port such denials. The defendant may also allege certain
affirmative defenses including condonation and recrimina-
tion. The defendant has the burden of proving condonation
but not recrimination since the complaining spouse in Mis-
souri has the burden of establishing his or her own innocence
of having created grounds for divorce. In most jurisdictions
this burden is not imposed on the plaintiff and the defendant
must plead and prove that the plaintiff has committed acts
creating a good defense to the divorce.23
The existence of these two defenses in Missouri and in
a large number of other jurisdictions brings into sharp relief
the pervasiveness of fault in the divorce process. 4 Condona-
tion is the defense of the plaintiff's knowing forgiveness of
the defendant's marital offense and his restoration to full
marital rights on the condition that the same and other of-
fenses will not occur in the future.25 Recrimination embodies
the concept of fault and punishment. As the Missouri courts
have so succinctly put it, "If both parties have a right to
divorce, neither party has."2 Thus, the parties to a divorce
' Missouri also recognizes the well-known defenses of connivance and collu-
sion. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.030; Aschemeyer, A Survey of Some Aspects of
Missouri Divorce Law, 27 Mo. L. REv. 344-46 (1962). Connivance involves the
corrupt consent of the complaining spouse to the other's marital misconduct, nor-
mally adultery. Collusion involves the corrupt conspiracy between the plaintiff and
defendant to obtain a divorce decree for the plaintiff when he or she would not
otherwise be entitled to it. See Rapp v. Rapp, 145 S.W. 114, 115 (Mo. Ct. App.
1912); CLARK, supra note 4, at 359-60. Connivance is rarely found in divorce actions
and since collusion must, by definition, involve the defendant, it is rarely pleaded
by him regardless of the frequency of its occurrence.
" The defenses of condonation, collusion and connivance are recognized in the
District of Columbia by common law decision. See Geer and Geer, 134 A.2d 110
(D.C. Mun. App. 1957); Davis v. Davis, 191 A.2d 138 (D.C. Mun. App. 1963);
Bateman v. Bateman, 42 App. D.C. 230 (1914). As a result of legislation in 1935,
recrimination is no longer recognized as a defense to a divorce suit in the District
of Columbia. 49 STAT. 539; Vanderhuffv. Vanderhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
Recrimination remains relevant, however, in determining which spouse is entitled
to the divorce and whether alimony should be allowed. See Dausel v. Dausel, 195
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Vanderhuffv. Vanderhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
"5 See Weber v. Weber, 189 S.W. 577, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); O'Neil v.
O'Neil, 264 S.W. 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); CLARK, supra note 4, at 365-70; Madden,
supra note 6, at 300-05.
2 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 43 Mo. 547, 549 (1869); Langshaw v. Langshaw, 331
S.W.2d 15, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
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action may not free themselves from an obviously dead mar-
riage if each can show that the other "sinned" against the
marital relationship. The law leaves them in perpetual
human bondage, free only to enter into meretricious relation-
ships with third persons.
27
The oppression of the fault system is magnified at trial
by the adversary system. No one connected with the court
proceedings is spared. In a contested case, the emotional
trauma experienced by the parties as a result of the break-
down of the marriage is heightened by the armed camp at-
mosphere. Total warfare is required because the stakes are
high. The one labeled "at fault" will be stigmatized and may
lose rights in the marital property and custodial rights to the
children of the marriage. 2 In an effort to "win," the parties
are forced to demean themselves, their counsel and the court
by parading in public the sordid aspects of their relationship
and, too often, by engaging in personal vilification and even
perjury. Friends and neighbors of the warring parties may be
brought into the sordid little drama to provide "corrobora-
tion" of the defendant's or cross-defendant's wrongdoing and
testimony of the plaintiff's good character. In Missouri, for
instance, a divorce is rarely granted on the uncorroborated
evidence of one of the parties.
2
1
21 Despite attacks on this defense by legal scholars, see, e.g., CLARK, supra note
4, at 373-74, and limitation of the defense by common law decision in some jurisdic-
tions, see, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952) (trial
courts given discretion whether to apply the bar); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah
178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953) (divorce given to party least at fault-"comparative recti-
tude"); Hathaway v. Hathaway, 23 Wash. 2d 237, 160 P.2d 632 (1945). The Mis-
souri courts continue to uphold the recriminatory defense without modification. See
Hugeback v. Hugeback, 444 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
21 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.090 (1959). In referring to this statute a distin-
guished St. Louis County Juvenile Court Judge has said, "The fault concept is
carried out in penal form in a statute which requires the forfeiture by the 'guilty
party' of all rights and claims under the marriage. The financial status of the
spouses, their needs in relation to their ages and economic and social status, their
contribution to the family estate, their health, earning ability or capacity and all
other valid considerations in determining the right to alimony are totally elminated
if the party in want is, under the rule of decisions, determined to be the 'guilty
party.'" Weinstein, Proposed Changes In the Law of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. REv. 307,
328 (1962). See also, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 139 (repealed 1954); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4509 (West 1971). Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-913 (1967).
2 See, e.g., Haushalter v. Haushalter, 197 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
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One could be grateful that less than ten percent of all
divorce actions in this country are contested if it were not
for the fact that the fault system seems to work even more
oppressively in the uncontested case. There may be less per-
sonal vilification of the defendant but the increase in the
amount of perjury and fraud more than offsets the decrease
in name-calling and scandalmongering.3' Inconsistent with
the statutory mandate that an enumerated fault ground
exist before the state will grant a divorce, the couple who
wants to bury their dead marriage will agree to seek legal
dissolution, cast about for the ground least offensive to the
defendant (normally the husband) and then fabricate a case,
complete with faithful character witnesses. In Missouri the
ground usually chosen is "general indignities." Elsewhere it
may be "mental cruelty. ' 32 Whatever this least offensive
ground is called, the scenario will normally follow this line:
after the collusive agreement is entered into, the wife will
find a lawyer and tell him that her husband has been "cold
and indifferent" toward her or has treated her badly. The
attorney, knowing that no real ground for divorce exists, or
that a real ground is too sensitive to use will ask about spe-
cific acts of the husband which might constitute general in-
dignities or mental cruelty.3 The power of suggestion is great
Thirty-five states required corroboration of divorce grounds as of 1970. See
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER CHART ON DIVORCE ANNULMENT AND SEPARATION
IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
1o See M. PLOSCOWE, D. FREED & H. FOSTER, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
313, 344 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PLOscOwE]; H. FOSTER, JR., COMMON
LAW DIVORCES 46, 55-56 (1961); Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns
of Behavior in Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267, 283 (1971).
3' Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VAND. L. REV. 633, 634 (1956); Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns
of Behavior In Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267, 285 (1971).
32 "[Alnyone who takes a realistic look at the operation of the existing divorce
law in states like Colorado must concede that it permits divorce by consent in all
but a minute proportion of the cases, but that it does so by means of the transparent
fiction that cruelty has occurred." Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42
U. COLO. L. REV. 403, 407 (1971). Prof. Clark cites the fact that before recent
legislative reform 95 per cent of all California divorces were granted on the ground
of cruelty.
m Professor T. Walker discusses the ethical strains placed upon lawyers in
uncontested divorce cases because of the fault system and their varying behavioral
reactions in his article, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior In
1972-73]
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in this situation and the lawyer soon has sufficient basis for
framing a petition. The wife's lawyer will work out with the
husband's lawyer the necessary property settlement and ali-
mony and custody agreements to be ratified by the court. So
long as these arrangements are reasonable on their face, the
attorneys involved in the case have little fear that the judge
will raise roadblocks to the parties' divorce scheme. While in
theory, the judge is supposed to protect the interest of the
state in safeguarding the integrity of its fault divorce system,
he is a party (willing or not) to the subterfuge which unfolds
in his courtroom. He has heard the dialogue before. 34 The
wife testifies that she has been a resident of the jurisdiction
for the requisite period of time. She testifies that she has
been a good and faithful wife to the defendant. She then
testifies to the mental suffering to which she has been sub-
jected by, for instance, the husband's continual ridicule of
her in front of family, friends and neighbors. At this point
one or more of these friends and neighbors will step forward
to testify to the good character of the plaintiff and corrobo-
rate the plaintiff's evidence of indignities or cruelty. The
defendant husband, of course, does not appear to defend
himself.
The judge will then ask if the parties have agreed on
property division, alimony, child support and custody of the
children, if any. The wife's lawyer will present the agree-
ments to the court for quick perusal. The judge may ask a
few questions to satisfy himself as to the fairness of the
agreements. If he is so satisfied, he will then indicate that a
decree will be granted.
35
Response to Present Divorce Laws, supra note 30, at 279-91. Three distinct behav-
ioral reactions are noted: (1) refusal to take the case and referral of the prospective
client to another attorney, usually in a smaller or less-established firm; (2) accept-
ance of the case but careful structuring of the legal services provided so that no
direct participation in the subterfuge could be asserted; (3) acceptance of the case
with full knowledge of the collusion of the husband and wife. More than 40 per cent
of the lawyers interviewed in the study relied upon by Professor Walker manifested
the last behavioral reaction. Id. at 290.
34 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 362; Kay, A Family Court: The California
Proposal, 56 CAUF. L. REv. 1205, 1219 (1968); Walker, supra note 30, at 284-86.
3 In the District of Columbia, the grounds for divorce are enacted by Congress
[Vol. 12
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The whole stylized process may take less than ten min-
utes. But in those ten minutes the state's fault system has
once again been subverted and all the persons involved di-
minished. The lawyers, though serving their clients' best
interests, have bent or broken the ethical canons of their
profession. 6 The judge, though serving the real needs of so-
rather than by a local governing body. Perhaps the traditionally paternalistic atti-
tude of Congress toward the District explains the severely limited grounds for
absolute divorce. The present grounds for divorce a viniculo are adultery, desertion,
conviction of a felony (with a prison term of at least two years) and voluntary
separation for one year. A limited divorce may be granted on the ground of physical
cruelty. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904 (1967). As a result of the lack of an adequate
number of grounds, the same process of suborning perjury which results in the
recitals of cruelty in other jurisdictions often occurs in the District with respect to
the date of separation of the parties. At trial, since even an uncontested divorce
based on voluntary separation must be corroborated, memories of the plaintiff and
the supporting witness become strangely dim, dates become hazy and periods of
actual separation of less than one year are mysteriously enlarged to exactly one
year. That the sham involves a period of separation rather than "cruelty" makes it
no less demeaning to the parties.
38 The entire process of divorce severely strains present concepts
of professional ethics. Several important questions often arise in divorce
litigation which rarely if ever occur in other areas of the law. One of the
most important issues revolves around the question of whether a lawyer
has a duty to attempt conciliation of a couple even when adequate
grounds for divorce exist. Since professional counselors are virtually
unanimous in agreeing that successful marital counseling must involve
both parties, may a lawyer who takes his duty to seek reconciliation
seriously explore the possibilities of getting back together with both
spouses? The New Jersey Supreme Court has answered this question in
the negative, holding that a lawyer may not counsel both parties and then
seek to represent one of the spouses if the reconciliation fails. In re Braun,
49 N.J. 16, 227 A.2d 506 (1967). But cf. Peeples, Lawyers and Divorce,
19 TENN. L. REv. 930, 936 (1947) (asserts that lawyers have a "duty" to
seek the reconciliation of the parties).
Under the fault statutes, collusion by both parties is almost always a defense
to the divorce action. May an attorney properly participate in a collusive divorce
where grounds are manufactured by the consent of both spouses? Such collusion is
quite a common practice in most jurisdictions, but is probably most frequently
resorted to in those areas where grounds for divorce are limited. In New York, before
the recent statutory changes, scenes of adultery were often fabricated. In the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the dates of separation are often falsified to permit divorce under
the one-year separation ground. The ethical conflict is quite clear. See ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(a)(4) (a lawyer may not "knowingly use
perjured testimony or false evidence."); Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics
in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HAv. L. REv. 443, 448 (1953).
Present divorce litigation often causes deliberate and knowing violations of a
lawyer's ethical responsibilities. Subornation of perjury is probably the most com-
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ciety, has failed to defend laws which he has sworn to up-
hold. The parties, though seeking only a decent way to end
an unfortunate relationship, have imposed on the court,
committed perjury and perhaps suborned perjury.
The entire fault divorce system creates strains on our
legal system. But perhaps more important, fault divorce fails
to reflect sociological and psychological realities.
C. MARITAL DISCORD AND DIVORCE: THE PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS
It is common knowledge today that the social institution of mar-
riage is not working as we should like it to. To be sure, the institu-
tion of marriage is here to stay, but it is not the same anymore.
It is rickety; its joints creak. It threatens to crack wide open.
Although marriage may be ordained in heaven, it is surely falling
apart on earth, at least in our part of the world. 7
Simply by virtue of his personal observation, it must be
quite clear to a layman that the current divorce laws are
dysfunctional. That these laws are not compatible with mod-
ern marital behavior and expectations is even more apparent
to the social scientists in the field.
Perhaps the threshold question in this area is not the
effect and operation of the divorce laws, but what, from a
sociological and pscyological perspective, is American mar-
riage. One writer examining the contemporary phenomenon
of the widespread growth of marriage counseling services
noted:
The most curious thing about marriage, I think, is not that it fails
so often but that it happens so often, considering that it and we
are, in many ways, so grossly incompatible. We marry; we
mon violation. But even under the new no-fault statutes, an attempt at reconcilia-
tion under the present ethical standards may bar the attorney from later represent-
ing the spouse. The dilemma forces a choice between the obvious social benefits of
a reconciliation and the economic benefit to the lawyer (who may represent a single
party and collect a fee if, and only if, he has not attempted joint counseling). The
ethical problems peculiar to divorce litigation have not been given the attention
they are properly due under either the old fault or the new non-fault statutes.
31 Ackerman, The Family Approach to Marital Disorders, in PSYCHOTHERAPIES
OF MARITAL DISHARMONY 153 (B. Green ed. 1965).
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fail-something fails, at any rate; we remarry; we hope. What
for?"8
We cannot hope to answer this "What for?" but we can
examine the institution in empirical terms. Undoubtedly,
mate selection in the United States contains a strong, per-
haps theoretically preeminent "love" factor; and this same
factor does not exist in some other cultures. Additionally,
Americans labor strenuously under some grossly incorrect
and debilitating stereotypes, such as the notion, commonly
accepted, that "opposites attract." The "opposites" theory
is debilitating because people sometimes tend to base what
would otherwise be more rational decisions on the concept.
The theory is misleading because social scientists have
shown us that the reverse is normally true. Similarities at-
tract; opposites do not.
1. Mate Selection
The social sciences have developed at least two gener-
ally accepted theories with respect to mate selection. The
first is commonly called the principle of homogamy. Its
premise is the reverse of the "attraction of opposites" notion;
and it holds, in part, that spouses are selected more for their
similarities than for their differences. The group of couples
studied, with all measurements being taken during engage-
ment, had a similarity correlation ranging from -.02 to +.58
with median correlation for all couples studied of +.30.11
Given the general acceptance of this proposition-that
persons of similar religion, economic status and personality
11 Lear, Save the Spouses Rather than the Marriage, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1972, (Magazine), at 12.
3' Kelly, Consistency of the Adult Personality, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 659, 680
(1955). While the expression of findings in terms of correlation factors is common
in the social sciences, it is uncommon in legal research. To understand the concept
generally one should think of the correlation spectrum as being a range of positive
and negative numbers from -1.0 through 0 to +1.0. "0" indicates a purely random
distribution, + 1.0 indicates a perfect positive correlation (for the purposes of this
study, it would mean that both husband and wife each exhibited all the same
characteristics such as religion, temperament, educational background, etc.). A
correlation of - 1.0 indicates that a given couple had no characteristics in common.
A correlation of +.30 in this area is generally regarded as significant.
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tend to marry each other, the theory still does not explain
the more specialized choices within the larger categories.
Moreover, recent studies have tried to account not only for
the dependent variables such as class, religion and educa-
tion, but also for the independent variables which inevitably
intrude but which are not always accounted for. In a 1963
study of engaged coeds at Duke University, the women were
measured in terms of their geographic and social mobility
and the occupations of their fathers, along with their own
religions, economic and educational status.40 In summarizing
the results, Professor Alan C. Kerckhoff suggested that the
principle of homogamy, while partially supported by the
study, is not specific enough in terms of its incorporation of
specific independent considerations. The conclusion was
quite equivocal, indicating that further research is neces-
sary: "In any future investigation we need particularly to
differentiate clearly between the process of mate selection
and the outcome of that process ... "I'
A secondary hypothesis was thought necessary to aid in
explaining the factors in the choice of mate within the larger
areas of similarities which the principle of homogamy has
identified. As noted above, the homogamy principle is fine
for explaining a spouse's broad choice,' but of no help what-
soever in determining how one narrows preferences, assum-
ing a homogamous group. Professor R. F. Winch, in a series
of articles, has devised an idea (more accurately a hypothe-
sis) which explains selection of mate in terms of one's own
needs as well as the spouse's attributes. As Professor Winch
explains it:
The theory of complementary needs offers the following hypothe-
sis: in mate selection each individual seeks within his or her field
of eligibles for that person who gives the greatest promise of pro-
viding him or her with maximum need gratification.' 2
,0 Kerckhoff, Patterns of Homogamy and the Field of Eligibles, 42 SocIAL
FORCEs 289 (1964).
41 Id. at 297.
42 Winch, Another Look at the Theory of Complementary Needs in Mate
Selection, 29 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 756 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Winch]. In a
series of three articles Professor Winch outlined the results of an intensive study of
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"Needs," in this sense, is to be regarded as a psychological
term which expresses the desire of any living organism to
seek gratification or fulfillment of particular wants. A need
may be as simple as hunger or as complex as a desire for
superior academic achievement. In the matter of spousal
selection, the needs sought to be gratified are normally of a
higher level than the elementary requirements of existence,
for example, hostility, dependence, gregariousness.43 Failure
of the parties to a marriage to satisfy each others' needs can
lead to marital difficulties.
Professor Winch's study tends to confirm two related
hypotheses: (1) that often the same need is gratified in both
husband and wife but at different levels of intensity (if one
spouse is dominant, the other's dominance need will be low);
and (2) that need gratification between spouses tends to be
complementary (if one spouse is highly nurturant, tending to
give rather than to receive, the other spouse will be high in
a dependency need, tending to receive rather than give)."
The concept of complementarity leads to another impor-
tant question, with both sociological and psychological im-
plications. The initial idea of complementary needs began as
a purely psychological construct; the needs were needs of
personality. Professor Winch has since suggested that a new
sociological dimension should be added to increase the abil-
ity of the theory to predict. He urges the incorporation of role
theory in the principle of complementarity.
The idea of role is founded on the premise that an indi-
vidual in any society is assigned a role both by his own per-
25 married couples, one or both of whom were undergraduate students. The testing
procedures involved two interviews and a shortened version of the Thematic Apper-
ception Test (the psychological "projective" test in which the subject is shown a
provocative picture and asked to make up a story about it). The subjects were
assigned ratings which were then extrapolated to the study's findings.
, Id. at 758.
Psychiatrists have expressed virtually the same idea in psychiatric terms:
that the neuroses of husband and wife complement each other and indicate that
there is a dovetailing of conflict and defensive patterns. See Mittleman,
Complementary Neurotic Reactions in Intimate Relationships, 13 PsYcHonALYrIC
Q. 479 (1944); Oberndorf, Psychoanalysis of Married Couples, 25 PsYcHoAALrIC
REv. 453 (1938).
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ceptions and by social pressures. For instance, up to a few
years ago, the socially acceptable role for a woman was gen-
erally that of a submissive, dutiful wife-a good homemaker.
Cultural and social pressures forced most women to conform
to this model. Conversely, a man's role was dominant and
aggressive. The sociological viewpoint is that these social or
interpersonal perceptions and reactions can, in and of them-
selves, shape behavior. As the distinction between role and
personality has been explained:
Role directs our attention to behaviors and attitudes that are
appropriate to a situation, irrespective of the actor, whereas per-
sonality directs our attention to behavior and attitudes that are
characteristic of the actor, irrespective of the situation."
As the role theory has been incorporated into the hy-
pothesis of complementarity, researchers have gone beyond
the personality approach (which postulates that it makes no
difference which spouse has what need as long as one is high
and the other low). The newer approach favors asking the
additional question of whether the need is affected by the
specific role of man and woman. Professor Winch has ex-
plained the significance of this additional dimension as:
where personality and role are mutually consistent, this . . .
should not generate intrapsychic conflict, which the pair of actors
would find that their relationhip is given normative support
[sic]. On the other hand, where personality is in conflict with
role, each actor is put in a situation to suffer intrapsychic conflict
(unless each accepts a self-definition as a deviant) and criticism
on normative grounds."
By way of illustration, if a man (husband) is high on domi-
nance and a woman (wife) is high on submissiveness by vir-
tue of their personalities, there should be little conflict since
these are also the roles society assigns to men and women
Winch, supra note 42, at 760.
" Id. at 761. It should be noted that both the role theory and the hypothesis
of complementarity say nothing about mate selection processes of persons with
mental disorders. Neurotic persons quite often engage in neurotic mate selection
and thereby doom their chances of a successful marriage almost from the start. See




generally and to spouses. However, if a wife is high on domi-
nance and a husband high on submissiveness, their personal-
ity traits conflict with societal roles and thus contain at least
a potential for conflict.
2. Marital Existence
While mate selection is often fun, at least from the ado-
lescent "dating" viewpoint, the status of being married is
quite a different matter. It involves, as any married couple
will concede, a considerable adjustment by both parties
whether or not their initial selection of mate is correct. At
least one study has indicated that most of the adjusting is
done by the wife.47
Marriage is generally viewed from a sociological
perspective as a matter of role, and marital behavior pat-
terns are seen in terms of role theory. Role is essentially a
matter of one's personal behavior regulated by a number of
cultural norms, and one's perspective as to his "place"
within these norms. Therefore, one would conventionally
expect a marine drill-sergeant to act tough or an infant's
nurse to be gentle. It is generally conceded that even when
the individual's previous behavior does not match his role,
social and cultural pressures may help him (or force him,
depending on one's own views) to adapt. As one researcher
has discovered:
[T]he central problem of roles stems from the condition that the
new husband or wife are usually not experienced in these new
roles and the definition of these roles have often not been worked
out between them but have been derived separately from the
other social systems to which they were oriented before mar-
riage. 8
One's own role in marriage is additionally complicated
by one's role expectations. Not only does a spouse have some
idea as to his own marital behavior; he has additional pre-
conceived notions about his spouse's role. Thus we have a
11 E. BURGESS, ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE 614 (1953). See also BERNARD, supra
note 1.
48 Dyer, Analyzing Marital Adjustment Using Role Theory, 24 MARRIAGE &
FAMILY LIVING 373 (1962).
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perfect setting for conflict if the spouses cannot adjust: (1)
with respect to one's role and (2) with respect to one's expec-
tations for a spouse.
Role theory, of course, does not completely explain mar-
ital conflict; and role adjustment, in and of itself, may not
resolve certain marital problems. Role theory does not delve
sufficiently into specific psychological problems such as sex-
ual conflicts and disorders of the personality-factors which
may also disrupt marriage. Professor R. Stagner has pointed
out that:
the marital role can be played by an individual only within the
limits defined by his already-crystallized personality. If this per-
sonality lacks integration (incorporates contradictory expecta-
tions and values) his enactment of the role is going to be erratic
and disturbing .... 11
The marital relationship is one of such intensity that the
intensity itself perhaps breeds conflict. It is one of the few
relationships in adult society voluntarily entered into in
which the two participants agree to spend large amounts of
time together, to establish themselves as a single economic
unit and to engage in a sexual relationship.
The general professional attitude toward the role which
sex, and concomitantly sexual difficulties, play in the mar-
riage is summarized by the following:
Clinical experience indicates that a good sex life does not insure
a happy marriage, nor do sexual difficulties necessarily cause
marital breakdown . . . There is no question, however, that
happy marriages are marked by a greater degree of sexual satis-
11 R. STAGNER, PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY 436 (3d ed. 1965). There is at least
some evidence that marital adjustment can be predicted, although in a realistic
sense it is questionable whether courting couples would seek to research these
factors prior to marriage (this is perhaps a central defect of much psychological
research; it has only after-the-fact significance). Professor Terman has isolated
several factors which he claims are highly predictive of marital adjustment includ-
ing: (1) superior happiness of children, (2) childhood happiness, (3) lack of conflict
with mother, (4) home discipline that was firm not harsh, (5) strong attachment to
mother, (6) strong attachment to father, etc. L. TFMAN, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
IN MARITAL HAPPINESs 372 (1938).
1o Eisenstein, Sexual Problems in Marriage, in NEUROTIC INTERACTION IN
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faction, while unhappy marriages have a much higher incidence
of sexual conflicts.
5 0
Furthermore, generalized characteristics of unhappy
couples can often be isolated. The following is a partial list
of some of these factors in nontechnical language:
1. The couple is unfriendly toward each other and
would be likely to be so whether they were married to each
other or not;
2. They are basically suspicious of each other, distrust
each other's motives and disrespect each other's judgment;
3. The couple's basic roles in life as man and woman
are confused, refused or neglected;
4. The couple suffers from a blackout of communica-
tion;
5. The couple has only their desparation in common
and their intentions and behavior are geared toward neutral-
izing and isolating the marriage from the rest of their lives.5
3. The Concept of Divorce
The sociological and psychological view of divorce is
strikingly different from the ecclesiastical or legal concept.
It is true that many marital difficulties can be overcome
through the individual effort of the spouses as, for example,
when one spouse consciously alters either his role or his role
expectations for the sake of saving the marriage. Occasion-
ally, spouses resort to third-party conflict resolution (the
various types of marriage counselors).12 Nonetheless there
MARRIAGE 101 (5th ed. Eisenstein 1968). For example, Eisenstein says:
Sexual frigidity very commonly results in marital infidelity-the frigid
wife searches for sexual satisfaction, the husband reacts to his frigid and
unresponsive wife. Legally, infidelity is grounds for divorce. Psychiatri-
cally, however, it is generally the acting out of neurotic conflict. Id. at
107.
5 Oates, Paranoid Interaction in Marriage, 4 J. FAM. L. 200, 203-04 (1964). See
also Jacobson, Conflict of Attitudes Toward the Roles of Husband and Wife in
Marriage, 17 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL Rxv. 146 (1952).
5" The Los Angeles Conciliation Court, one of the largest and best staffed
counseling services in the country, reports that a very large proportion of its cases
(large, in the sense of what one would expect) are voluntary petitions for counseling
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are some marriages which, contrary to Good Housekeeping's
assertions, cannot be saved. Professor W. Goode views di-
vorce as a sort of safety valve "for the inevitable tensions of
married life. '53 He feels, quite simply, that there are rela-
tionships which cannot easily be altered to make the mar-
riage smoother. Divorce provides a quick and unequivocal
termination of such marriages.
4. Divorce: Its Causes
Goode advises us that any search for the "cause" or
"causes" of divorce is doomed from its inception. He feels
such a question is a "common sense one, and like most com-
mon sense questions it is not useful for scientific research."54
It is possible to outline factors inherent in any marriage
which tend to precede divorce, of course; but as we have seen
these factors have little practical application since mate
selection is not necessarily a rational process.5
In Goode's study, he was often troubled by the fact that
our culture tends to rely on the traditional legal grounds for
divorce as a complete and full explanation of why a given
marriage breaks up. Thus, if a wife receives a divorce on the
grounds of adultery, the conventional wisdom accepts the
showing of the adultery as the "cause" of the divorce, regard-
less of whether the adultery was an isolated incident, a series
of affairs or a long-standing triangular relationship.
sought by couples who have not filed any divorce pleadings. The court indicates
that in 1971, 37 percent of the petitions for counseling filed (1,754 of 4,688 total)
came from couples between whom no court action was pending.
3 Goode, A Sociological Perspective on Marital Dissolution, SOCIOLOGY OF THE
FAMILY 301, 303 (1971). See also Lear, Save the Spouses Rather than the Marriage,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1972, (Magazine), at 12.
W. GOODE, WOMEN IN DIVORCE 113 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GOODE].
" Goode has summarized various characteristics which seem to indicate a sort
of "divorce proneness." These factors include: (1) urban rather than rural back-
ground, (2) marriage at very young age, (3) short acquaintanceship before marriage,
(4) short or no engagement, (5) marital unhappiness of parents, (6) mixed religious
faith, (7) disapproval of kin and friends of marriage, etc. Perhaps not surprisingly,
Goode also indicates that a propensity toward divorce is inversely related to the
husband's income and social "rank" of his occupation, i.e., the lower the husband's
income and/or the lower his occupation status, the more likely he is to become
divorced. Goode, Family Disorganization, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 417,
418, 425 (R. Morton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961).
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It is often true, of course, that the incidents which pro-
vide legal grounds for divorce actually occurred; that is, they
occurred in fact, and were not manufactured as the adultery
scenes so common in the state of New York prior to their
divorce reform in 1967.58 Still, this can not completely ex-
plain the factors which lead to the breakup since many mar-
riages have undergone similar experiences and remained in-
tact.
Goode attempted to circumvent this problem by asking
each divorced wife in the study what reasons she thought
caused the breakup of her own marriage. The results were
surprising. The most frequently assigned reason was non-
support (a factor cited by a full third of the wives); second
came authority conflicts (who dominates whom and to what
extent); and far down the list was the notion of adultery
(Goode uses the term "triangle" meaning a liaison between
the husband and another woman whom the wife could
specifically identify)." Perhaps the most surprising finding
in the study is the lumping of sexual problems in the "mis-
cellaneous" category coupled with Goode's assertion that "as
every serious survey has shown, sexual problems do not ac-
count for any large proportion of the 'causes' for marital
disruption. This was also the case for our own study."5
Moreover, quite often each wife had a number of complaints
to lodge against her husband, indicating that most marital
breakdowns are the result of a multiplicity of factors rather
than the result of a single unforgiven incident.
The answer to the question of what causes divorce is
probably that there is no one answer. Each marriage is
unique and has unique problems. No marriage founders for
precisely the same reasons as any other marriage. We can
isolate no single "cause" of divorce anymore than we can
51 For example, Professor Kephart found that when an accusation of alcoholism
was made against a spouse, that accusation was quite often true. Kephart, Drinking
and Marital Disruption, 15 Q.J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL, 64, 65 (1954).
GOODE, supra note 54, at 123.
Id. at 118-19. It was also noted that "[ailmost no wives claimed that the
divorce was mainly their fault. . . .Even when the wife admitted that she had
faults, she was not likely to admit that she was the major offender." Id. at 133.
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attribute human behavior to a single, identifiable stimulus.
Marriages between complex human beings break down for
complicated reasons. Divorce laws in the United States will
rest on a firmer base when all aspects of the divorce systems
of all our states recognize this fact.
II. LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO MODERN DIVORCE
THEORY
As we have just indicated, the social scientists have
known for some time that the old ecclesiastical concepts of
divorce are both outmoded and harmful. It is usually con-
ceded that divorce is a necessary, if not generally favored
institution. But scientific researchers do not normally vote
in state legislatures, and there has been a considerable lag
between the confirmation of the research findings and af-
firmative action by state legislatures.
When there has been legislative reaction, it has often
been due to considerations apart from a genuine interest in
either individual or public welfare. 9 Some legislatures have
employed a cut-and-paste approach to the problems of mar-
riage and divorce, merely adding easier grounds onto the
more traditional grounds of adultery, desertion and physical
cruelty.'" Only a few states, eight at the time of this writing,
have seen fit to completely alter their system of divorce by
abolishing grounds and creating a statutory scheme whereby
the courts may examine the whole marriage rather than iso-
lated instances of misconduct. No state has seen fit to imple-
ment the considerably more drastic measures of registration
marriage or divorce by consent.
It is virtually impossible to fully understand the actions
of state legislatures on a national scale since few states have
the means or the inclination to publish large scale legislative
histories on enacted statutes. In most cases, underlying as-
", The state of Nevada has often been accused of manipulating its divorce laws
deliberately to attract divorcing spouses from other states simply because the di-
vorce industry is a significant part of the state's economy. See generally N. BLAKE,
THE ROAD TO RENO (1962).
For examples of this piecemeal approach to divorce reform see text accompa-
nying notes 62 to 112 infra.
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sumptions, investigations and findings of the legislatures are
impossible to determine. Thus, any real understanding of
the origins and motivation of the legislation is difficult to
obtain.
But, with the exception of California whose legislature
has provided the public with a comprehensive legislative his-
tory of its sweeping new Family Law Act,"' and those few
states which have adopted the new Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, it seems fair to conclude from the face of exist-
ing divorce legislation that most state legislatures have paid
little or no attention to the body of knowledge made availble
through the empirical research of social scientists. This body
of knowledge suggests that major change is necessary in the
way we go about dissolving marriages. When the legislatures
respond to this felt need with less than major revision of
existing laws, their response must be categorized as too con-
servative.
A. CONSERVATIVE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE NEED
FOR DIVORCE REFORM
In this century a number of state legislatures have re-
sponded to the felt need for some alternative to the unrealis-
tic fault system. The conservative response has been to ap-
pend certain non-fault grounds to the existing fault statutes,
thereby purportedly permitting couples to dissolve dead
11 In California, legislative activity in the area of divorce reform had been
fermenting for years. In 1966, Governor Edmund G. Brown established the Gover-
nor's Commission on the Family, a multi-disciplinary venture which ultimately
drafted the Family Court Act, a comprehensive statute which completely reformed
family law in California and much of which became the Family Law Act of 1970.
Although everyone concerned, including Governor Brown, was willing to con-
cede the inadequacy of the present divorce law, there was little agreement at the
beginning on which approach to divorce law reform was preferable. The Governor's
Commission finally concluded that no piecemeal attack on the problems of marital
discord and family stability would suffice, that the necessity for lessening the
friction and trauma of separation and divorce required a thorough revamping of the
divorce laws. In his initial charge to the Commission, Governor Brown conceded
that "the time has come to acknowledge that our present social and legal proce-
dures for dealing with divorce are inadequate- .. " CALIFORNIA GoVERoa's COM-
MISSION ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 1 (1966). For a lengthy description of the complete
legislative history of the Family Law Act of 1970, see Krom, California's Divorce
Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAciuc L.J. 156 (1970).
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marriages without casting themselves in the roles of innocent
and guilty parties.12 Theoretically, the availability of such
11 A typical example of this type of response is the recently amended Delaware
divorce statute. Prior to its amendments in 1953, 1957 and 1968, this statute pro-
vided:
The causes for divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be-
(1) Adultery;
(2) Bigamy, at the suit of the innocent and injured party to the
first marriage;
(3) Conviction and sentence for crime by a competent court having
jurisdiction, followed by a continuous imprisonment for at least two
years, or in the case of indeterminate sentence, for at least one year,
if, such conviction has been the result of trial in some one of the
States of the United States, or in a Federal Court, or in some one of
the territories, possession or courts subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, or in some foreign country granting a trial by jury,
followed by an equally long term of imprisonment;
(4) Extreme cruelty, on the part of either husband or wife, such as
to endanger the life or health of the other party or to render cohabi-
tation unsafe;
(5) Willful desertion for two years;
(6) Habitual drunkenness for two years;
(7) At the suit of the wife if she was under the age of 16 years at
the time of the marriage, unless such marriage is confirmed by her
after arriving at such age;
(8) At the suit of the husband if he was under the age of 18 at the
time of the marriage, unless such marriage is confirmed by him after
arriving at such age;
(9) At the suit of the wife for congenital or guiltily after-acquired
inability and failure to support his family, and of which congenital
or acquired inability the wife neither had nor could have had any
previous knowledge or warning at the time of the marriage;
(10) When either the husband or wife had been adjudged feeble-
minded, epileptic, or a chronic or recurrent insane person, and has
been under the supervision or care of an institution for mental di-
seases, during a period of five years. In addition to complying with
the requirements as to jurisdiction, residence, summons and service,
as provided in this chapter, the petitioner shall request the Superior
Court to appoint a commission of five persons to inquire into the
respondent's mental and physical condition. One member of the
commission shall be the State Psychiatrist, one, a licensed physician
who has practiced medicine in the State for at least five years, one,
an attorney-at-law who has practiced law in the State for at least
five years, and the other two, laymen of good character who have
been residents in the State for at least five years. If the report of the
commission, so appointed, shall be that the person is feeble-minded,
epileptic, or a chronic or recurrent insane person, and has been
under the supervision or care of an institution for mental diseases
for a period of five years, or more, then the Superior Court may grant
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grounds should eliminate the need for public name calling
and subornation or perjury. But as a practical matter many
of the problems of the fault system have persisted, perhaps
because these nonfault grounds for divorce have been tacked
onto the fault system without sufficient legislative and judi-
cial consideration of their unique nature.63
1. Incompatibility
In his classic work American Family Laws, Professor C.
Vernier clearly perceived that the fault grounds listed in the
various state statutes did not reflect the real reasons for mar-
ital failure.
In fairness it may be freely admitted that it is incompatibility
which induces married persons to do the specific things which the
statutes name as causes for divorce. It may therefore be asked:
a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, making, however, in its discretion
such an order upon the petitioner for the support, care and treat-
ment of the feeble-minded, epileptic, or chronic or recurrent insane
person, as it deems fitting and proper. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1522 (1953). By amendments of 1957 and 1968, the following
major non-fault grounds were added:
(11) When husband and wife have voluntarily lived separate and
apart, without any cohabitation for 18 consecutive months prior to
the filing of the divorce action and such separation is beyond any
reasonable expectation of reconciliation.
(12) When husband and wife are incompatible in that their mar-
riage is characterized by rift or discord produced by reciprocal con-
flict of personalities existing for 2 consecutive years prior to the filing
of the divorce action, and which has destroyed their relationship as
husband and wife and the reasonable possibility of reconciliation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1522 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
6' Again, the Delaware Code provides an example. Section 1531(a) of Title 13
provides that if a husband obtains a divorce "for the wife's aggression," the court
will have discretion to restore to her "the whole or a part of her real estate, and
also such share of her husband's personal property as seems reasonable." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13 § 1531(a) (1953). In Buonassisi v. Buonassisi, 267 A.2d 888 (Del.
Super. 1970), the appellate court was forced to grapple with the concept of "aggres-
sion" by the wife in a husband's suit for divorce on the ostensible non-fault ground
of incompatibility. In order to make possible the restoration to the wife of her real
property, if any, and the transfer to her of a reasonable share of the husband's
personal property, the court was forced to conclude that in reality the ground of
incompatibility required mutual fault. Section 1531(a) was amended just prior to
the court's decision in Buonassisi in such a way as to remove the fault-non-fault
friction with Section 1522(12), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531(a) (Cum. Supp.
1970).
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"Why not make incompatibility itself the main ground for di-
vorce?" 4
At the time Vernier wrote, only one American jurisdiction,
the Virgin Island, recognized incompatibility of the marital
partners as a legal basis for divorce. 5 Today, ten American
states list incompatibility, or a variant thereof, as a ground
for divorce. 6
It is clear that the Danish law upon which the ground
of incompatibility is patterned permitted divorce without a
showing of fault. 7 And the generally accepted definition of
incompatibility supports the conclusion that fault of either
party ought to be irrelevant to an action for divorce on this
ground.
Incompatibility of temperament . . . does refer to conflicts in
personalities and dispositions so deep as to be irreconcilable and
to render it impossible for the parties to continue a normal mari-
tal relationship with each other. To use the ancient Danish
phrase, the disharmony of the spouses in their common life must
be so deep and intense as to be irremediable. It is the legal recog-
nition of the proposition long established in the earlier Danish
law of the Islands that if the parties are so mismated that their
marriage has in fact ended as the result of their hopeless disagree-
ment and discord the courts should be empowered to terminate
it as a matter of law (emphasis supplied).8
V4 ERNIER, supra note 13, at 65.
65 See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1952); V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
16 § 104(a)(8).
66 ALA. CODE tit. 34 § 20(7) (Cum. Supp. 1971); ALAKSA STAT. § 09.55 110(5)
(C) (1962) ("incompatibility of temperament"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(12)
(Cum. Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE § 32-603(8) (Supp. 1972) ("irreconcilable differ-
ences"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010(10) (1969) ("incompatibility"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 458.7-a (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(8) (1953) ("in-
comp."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-09.1 (Supp. 1971) ("irreconcilable differ-
ences"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271(7) (1961) ("incompatibility"); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.01 (1969) (" ... if the marriage has become insupportable because
of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the mar-
riage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.").
Only Delaware gives a statutory definition to incompatibility. See note 57 supra.
67 See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1952); Shearer v. Shearer,
356 F.2d 391, 399-402 (3d Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion of Freedman, J.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966); CLARK, supra note 4, at 350.
66 Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1952). Accord, Hughes v. Hughes,
363 P.2d 155, 157 (Okla. 1961); Stuart v. Stuart, 433 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1967);
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Under this definition, the only showing that should be re-
quired is that the marriage has irreparably broken down be-
cause the spouses are unable to live together with any degree
of harmony. 9
Perhaps because legislators, judges and lawyers have
been conditioned to think in terms of fault when they deal
with grounds for divorce, serious distortions have occurred in
the operation of the incompatibility statutes, limiting their
usefulness as a civilized means of dissolving dead marriages.
By "civilized" we mean, of course, realistic and non-
recriminatory. There are at least four avenues by which fault
considerations may be injected into incompatibility actions.
First, legislatures may add the incompatibility ground with-
out regard to the language of the existing basic fault statute
or the collateral statutes dealing with certain of the incidents
of divorce such as property division or alimony. The terri-
torial legislature of the Virgin Islands, for instance, incorpo-
rating this uniquely Danish ground into American law,
tacked it onto a statute providing for separation or divorce
"at the instance of the injured party." Once one is forced to
think in terms of "an injured party,"7 it is also very easy to
think of the defendant as being at fault and to accept the
idea that only one of the spouses may be incompatible with
the other.7
Chappell v. Chappell, 298 P.2d 768, (Okla. 1956); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1958).
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. § 13-1522(12) (Cum. Supp. 1968). One jurisdiction, how-
ever, has attempted to avoid defining "incompatibility" with specificity in order
to insure that its courts will have flexibility in dealing with this ground. See Poteet
v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 114 P.2d 91 (1941). See also Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M.
480, 484, 50 P.2d 264, 267 (1935) (concurring opinion).
11 This is often established by evidence that the parties have been unable to
live together for a substantial period of time or, if they are still living under one
roof, that their quarreling and noncooperation are incessant. CLAK; Comment,
Divorce: Incompatibility as a Ground For, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 99, 101 (1954).
0 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 104(a) (1964).
7' This rather absurd idea that incompatibility is not necessarily mutual was
accepted and then rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Chappell v.
Chappell, 298 P.2d 768, 771 (Okla. 1956) (dictum), disapproved in Rakestraw v.
Rakestraw, 345 P.2d 888, 890 (Okla. 1959). Fortunately, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit was not misled as to the issue of mutual incompati-
bility by the language of the Virgin Island statute. See Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d
799, 808 (3d Cir. 1952). See also J.A.D. v. P.L.D., 259 A.2d 381 (Del. Super. 1969).
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A second avenue for the entry of fault is judicial unwill-
ingness to accept fully the implications of the non-fault na-
ture of the incompatibility ground. A number of courts for
instance recognize the epitome of fault-recrimination-as a
discretionary bar to a divorce action based on incompatibil-
ity." Whatever the plaintiff's offense, such a defense is illogi-
cal since fault is irrelevant to the question of whether the
marriage is beyond redemption. If anything, proof of the
plaintiff's transgressions ought to strengthen the ultimate
conclusion that the parties are incompatible.
The height of judicial insensitivity to this non-fault
ground has to be Schlesinger v. Schlesinger.73 There, two oft-
married middle-aged business executives were joined in ma-
trimony. While the wife was in Europe seeking furniture for
the new house they were planning to build, the husband
became infatuated with a much younger woman. Upon the
wife's return from Europe, she learned of her husband's new
amour and his desire for a divorce. Bitter quarrels followed,
marked by mutual violence, including biting, kicking and
throwing of heavy objects. The husband, who was on the
receiving end of the most of the thrown objects, brought an
action for divorce on the ground of incompatibility. The wife
cross-petitioned for a legal separation. At trial, despite her
petition for separation, the wife testified that she wished to
be reconciled. The husband testified to the contrary. The
trial court found that a state of incompatibility of tempera-
ment existed between the parties which was so deep-seated
that reconciliation was impossible and granted the divorce
to the husband. The Third Circuit held that such finding was
clearly erroneous and reversed the judgment. Ignoring the
fact that by the time a husband and wife become adversaries
in court their marriage is almost always dead, the court re-
lied on the fact that the parties got along well before the
For an example of the distortion which may be caused to proper construction
of incompatibility legislation by fault language in a collateral statute, see Buonas-
sisi v. Buonassisi, 267 A.2d 888 (Del. Super. 1970); note 61 supra.
72 See Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950); Burch v. Burch, 195
F.2d 700, 810 (3d Cir. 1952) (Virgin Islands).
11 399 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1968) (Virgin Islands).
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wife's ill-fated trip to Europe. The court did not consider
that the shorter stormy period after the wife's return from
Europe constituted a ground for divorce. "Combatibility,"
the court said, "is not per se incompatibility."74
The reason for the court's willingness to reverse even in
the face of the stringent "clearly erroneous" test was, in a
word, "fault."
To award a divorce, under the prevailing circumstances, to an
unfaithful husband on the ground that the righteous wrath of his
betrayed wife has made them incompatible would be to reward
him for marital infidelity. The Virgin Islands divorce statute can-
not be construed to sanction such an ironic result.7
But why shouldn't it be so construed when the court's own
analysis of the history of the incompatibility statute in
Burch v. Burch7" clearly establishes the non-fault nature of
the statute? Even more unusual is the court's willingness to
permit the defendant to seek a legal separation on fault
grounds on remand to the district court. Surely if the hus-
band wishes an absolute divorce and the wife wishes a lim-
ited divorce, the trial's finding of incompatibility could
hardly have been "clearly erroneous.""7
Another avenue for the introduction of fault considera-
tions is the evidence of incompatibility. The statutes fail to
delineate the kind of evidence which is admissible. It is only
natural then for the courts to hear evidence of the defen-
dant's fault in determining whether incompatibility exists.
Evidence of constant cruelty or adultery would certainly pro-
vide a basis for drawing a conclusion as to the incompatibil-
ity of the couple. Such evidence also, unfortunately, appears
to invite the introduction by defendants of the fault defenses
of recrimination and condonation. It should be enough for
7, Id. at 10.
" Id. at 10-11.
" Note 65 supra.
Separation of the parties is in itself an important factor in determining
incompatibility. See Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 114 P.2d 91 (1951); Comment,
Divorce: Incompatibility as Ground For, 7 OKLA. L. REv. 99, 100, 101 (1954).
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the plaintiff to testify to the fact that he or she can no longer
live with the defendant in any kind of harmony."
Finally, because of the insertion of the incompatibility
ground in an integrated system of fault legislation, fault con-
siderations will be present with regard to the incidents of an
incompatibility divorce, such as alimony, property division
and child custody.79
While granting that the small number of reported cases
in the seven American jurisdictions that recognize the
ground may suggest that the incompatibility statute is oper-
ating at the trial level with some degree of success, it is also
clear that it is not the civilized non-fault ground which we
received from the Danes and that the divorcing parties still
have to indulge in some degree of fault-fixing, with many of
the attendant problems which that creates."
2. Living Separate and Apart for a Stated Period
of Time
By far the most widespread and influential non-fault
ground found in essentially fault systems of divorce is the
living separate and apart by the parties for a prescribed pe-
riod of time. The thrust of this ground is a showing that the
parties have ceased living together as husband and wife.
11 A colloquy on a petition for dissolution upon the default of the respondent
might be conducted as follows:
Q. You have stated that there are irreconcilable differences between you
and your spouse. Is it your belief that your marriage has completely
broken down?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that conciliation counseling, the assistance of this
court, or a waiting period can restore the marriage?
CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR MANUAL, FAMILY LAW
PRACTICE § 2.26, 129-30 (1970).
See, e.g., Buonassisi v. Buonassisi, 267 A.2d 888 (Del. Super. 1970).
, Professor W. Wadlington holds out little hope for the future of non-fault
divorce through the incompatibility ground. "[Tihe preservation of such fault-
oriented defenses as recrimination frustrates the apparent legislative intent that the
addition of incompatibility as a ground should serve the purpose of dissolving
hopeless marriages. It would therefore seem that there is little future in a general
move to encourage other states to add incompatibility as a ground for divorce."
Wadlington, supra note 6, at 52.
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Theoretically, at least, the reasons for the cessation of coha-
bitation as well as fault defenses ought to be immaterial.
There are a number of statutory variations here. The
leading commentators identify four main categories of living
apart statutes."' The narrowest statutory mechanism author-
izes divorce only when the parties have lived apart under a
decree of separation or separate maintenance for the pre-
scribed period. 2 A second and somewhat broader type au-
thorizes divorce where the parties have voluntarily lived
apart for the prescribed period. 3 A third variation makes
divorce available only to the spouse innocent of causing the
separation. 4 The fourth type (the most liberal and wide-
spread) permits divorce solely upon proof that the parties
have been separated for the requisite period. 85 Specific re-
" CLARK, supra note 4, at 351; PLOscowE, supra note 30, at 353-57, Wadlington,
supra note 6, at 53-64.
11 ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 21(1) (Cum. Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-
30 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904(c) (1967); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-41(9)
(1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-302 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06(8) (Supp.
1972); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-
6-05 (Replacement Vol. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-802 (Cum. Supp. 1971);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(8) (Supp. 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(7) (Supp.
1972).
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (Cum. Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-903(a) (1967); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 24(5) (Cum. Supp. 1971); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (formal separation agreement
required); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(6) (Supp. 1972).
" WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-47 (1959). Prior to its amendment in 1972, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) required that the libelant seeking divorce on this ground
allege and prove absence of fault on his or her part for the separation. Winslow v.
Winslow, 127 Vt. 428, 251 A.2d 419 (1969); Krupp v. Krupp, 126 Vt. 511, 236 A.2d
653 (1967); West v. West, 115 Vt. 458, 63 A.2d 864 (1949). The 1972 amendment
eliminates the need for the plaintiff to establish his or her innocence. The Wyoming
statute does not require the plaintiff to prove his or her innocence regarding the
separation. Rather the burden of proof is placed on the defendant. Stinson v.
Stinson, 70 Wyo. 351, 250 P.2d 83 (1952); Dawson v. Dawson, 62 Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d
200 (1947). In Wyoming it is clear that the fault necessary to bar a divorce is not
to be equated to other grounds for divorce but may be any conduct which the trial
court in its discretion finds to be blameworthy. Brydon v. Brydon, 365 P.2d 55
(Wyo. 1961); Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 157 P.2d 280 (1945).
11 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312(7) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202'7)
(1947) (1962 Replacement Vol.); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-41(11) (Supp. 1972);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:301 (1965); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 16, § 24(7) (Cum. Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1966); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3 (1956) (discretion of the court); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101(5)
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quirements may vary somewhat within each category. The
mandatory separation period, for instance, extends any-
where from six months (Vermont)"8 to ten years (Rhode Is-
land)." All in all, half of the states have embraced one or
more of the forms of the living separate and apart ground.
There are a number of questions associated with the
living apart statutes, including the nature of the required
separation, the voluntariness of the separation (in those ju-
risdictions which require voluntary separation), the effect of
insanity upon the availability of the ground, the effect of
reconciliation attempts during the separation and jurisdic-
tional requirements. These matters are thoroughly covered
elsewhere and will not be discussed here.88 But two critical
matters are in need of further explication-retroactivity and
the persistence of fault.
Because most of the living apart statutes fail to indi-
cate whether a separation period experienced prior to the
effective date of the legislation is to be recognized in meeting
the required statutory period, 9 a vast amount of legal energy
is expended in resolving the question of retroactivity. The
modern trend of authority is to construe the statutes as en-
compassing separation periods begun prior to the effective
date of the legislation.'" Such construction appears correct
because it helps to effectuate the purpose of the legislation,
that is, permitting dissolution of marriages which are in fact
dead. How much simpler it would be for the courts if the
(Cum. Supp. 1971); No. 238, [19711 Vt. Laws Adj. Sess.; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.08.020(9) (Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-4 (Supp. 1972).
No. 238, [1971] Vt. Laws Adj. Sess., amending VT. STAT. ANN. § 15-551(7).
s R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3 (1956).
U See PLOSCOWE, supra note 30, at 353-58; Wadlington, supra note 6, at 68-79.
Exceptions are: ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22(1) (Cum. Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-101(5) (Cum. Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp.
1972). See Fuqua v. Fuqua, 268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958).
" See, e.g., Singley v. Singley, 256 S.C. 117, 181 S.E.2d 17 (1971); Gleason v.
Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970); Hagen v. Hagen,
205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965); Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N.W. 811
(1936); Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933). Cf. R.M.H. v.
S.M.H., 259 A.2d 376 (Del. 1969) (two year period of incompatibility required by




legislatures were merely to add to the living apart statutes
language to the effect that they apply whether the separa-
tions commenced prior to their effective dates or thereafter."
Whether retroactive operation of the statutes is made
possible by express legislative mandate or by judicial con-
struction, important constitutional questions regarding due
process arise because of the effect such operation might con-
ceivably have on alleged rights of the defendant spouse. As
one might deduce from the general trend toward retroactive
operation, the judiciary has recently resolved such constitu-
tional questions in favor of retroactivity.
In the leading case of Fuqua v. Fuqua,92 the Alabama
Supreme Court held in connection with a statute permitting
the conversion of a limited divorce or separate maintenance
into an absolute divorce after more than four years separa-
tion that the marital status was not a vested right protected
by the state (and, by implication federal) constitution from
retrospective destruction.9 3 Nor was there any constitution-
ally protected right to assert the defense of recrimination
which the Alabama statute had abolished.94 These rulings
are, of course, consistent with the strong majority view up-
holding statutes abolishing "heartbalm" actions such as
breach of promise and criminal conversation 5 and bode well
for more liberal no-fault divorce legislation.
In addition to marital status and the availability of de-
fenses, certain property rights arising out of the marriage
may be affected by the retrospective application of living
apart statutes. But unless those property rights are deter-
mined to be vested, there appears to be no constitutional
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
9 Fuqua v. Fuqua, 268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958).
,3 Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513 (1970); Hagen v. Hagen,
205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687
(1933).
,4 See also Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944).
"5 Anti-heart balm statutes have generally been held constitutional. See, e.g.,
Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 617
(1945).
" See text at notes 129-37 infra.
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infirmity in such application of the statutes. In Gleason v.
Gleason,97 the contention was made that the retrospective
operation of New York's new conversion statute98 would
constitutionally destroy Mrs. Gleason's social security, pen-
sion and inheritance benefits which she would otherwise ob-
tain. Therefore, it was asserted that the conversion of her
separation decree obtained more than ten years before the
enactment of the statute into one of absolute divorce, at the
behest of her husband, entertainer Jackie Gleason, consti-
tuted a taking of property without due process of law in
violation of the due process clauses of the state and federal
constitutions. The answer of Chief Judge Fuld was short and
direct. A wife's prospective right of inheritance is not a
vested one until the death of her husband, and inchoate
rights may be changed or destroyed by the state either di-
rectly through change in the rules of succession or other-
wise. 9 Prospective social security and pension benefits were
also held to be inchoate.
In short, the State, having the power directly to limit or
abolish rights of succession to the property of a living person, may
undoubtedly do so indirectly by providing a new ground for di-
vorce. Since then, no vested rights of the defendants have been
adversely affected, there has been no denial of due process."®
These state court rulings together with an earlier Su-
preme Court decision that the marriage contract is not one
covered by the impairment of obligations clause,"°' make it
appear that no real obstacle exists to the retroactive applica-
tion of the living apart statutes. However, if legislative
draftsmen would indicate clearly their desire regarding re-
troactivity, the courts could be spared considerable litigation
at the outset of the operation of liberalized divorce statutes.
Perhaps the most serious problem associated with the
living apart statutes is the persistence of fault concepts in
the minds of those persons who have the most influence on
' Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513.
" N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWS § 170(5) (1971).
gg Cf. Simons v. Miami Beach Nat. Bank, 381 U.S. 81, 85 (1965).
" Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y. 28, at 41, 256 N.E.2d 513, at 520.
101 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1888).
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the law-the legislators, divorce lawyers and judges. °2 Two
types of living apart statutes are drafted so as to insure con-
tinued emphasis on the fault of one or both of the parties.
The more important conversion type requires the existence
of a fault ground in the award initially of the separation or
separate maintenance decree, which may thereafter be con-
verted with the passage of time into a decree of absolute
divorce.'"3 And the "innocent spouse" type injects fault into
the proceedings by requiring or permitting a fault contest
much like the one fostered by the defense of recrimination.
Second, no matter what the type of living apart statute,
it is inserted, like the incompatibility statutes, ' 4 into an
essentially fault-oriented system; and a claim for alimony or
a contest over division of the property, for instance, may be
decided, at least in part, by weighing the claimant's or con-
testant's marital guilt or innocence.' 5 Thus, what is irrele-
vant to the divorce itself takes on major importance in the
same proceedings when these collateral matters are litigated.
As a leading commentator has observed, "IT]he approach
frequently involves a choice between letting the parties reach
their own financial agreements or litigating the question of
fault separately for alimony purposes."'0 °
Without this fault context, some of the living apart stat-
utes might serve to terminate dead marriages quite well even
in contested cases. One of the most progressive living apart
statutes in the United States is the one recently enacted in
102 See CLARK, supra note 4, at 252-54.
03 The District of Columbia has what might aptly be called a "double fault"
system in a non-love game. A fault ground, usually desertion, must be established
by the petitioner before he or she may obtain the separation decree or limited
divorce in the first instance. Later, only the innocent spouse may convert the
separation decree into an absolute divorce. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904(c) (1967).
10, See text at notes 70-75 supra.
05 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Lancaster, 212 Va. 127, 183 S.E.2d 158 (1971); Guy
v. Guy, 210 Va. 536, 172 S.E.2d 735 (1970); Fair v. Fair, 232 Ark. 800, 341 S.W.2d
22 (1960); Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (1959). The Arkansas
legislature has even included in its statute a provision that "who is the injured party
shall be considered only in cases wherein by the pleadings the wife seeks alimony
• . .or a division of property. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(7) (1947) (1962
Replacement Vol.).
I" Wadlington, supra note 6, at 23, 79.
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Vermont.107 It permits divorce when the parties have lived
separate and apart for six months, whether voluntarily or
not, for any reasons and the court finds that resumption of
marital relations is not reasonably probable. If a contest de-
velops as to the fact of separation or the reasonable probabil-
ity of reconciliation the court may continue the proceeding
and suggest marriage counseling.
The non-fault nature of the required findings and the
provision for counseling are quite helpful. But the Vermont
legislature did not go far enough. Fault grounds still abound
in Vermont, and the statutes requiring the court to consider
"the respective merits of the parties" in dividing the prop-
erty and awarding alimony in a "just and equitable" manner
encourage the parties to bring forth evidence of wrongdoing
on the part of the other spouse.'0 8 Moreover, the divorce con-
test remains an adversary proceeding. If the legislatures
101 P.A. No. 238, [1971] VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7). This statute provides
inter alia:
Sec. 1:
(7) When a married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for
six consecutive months and the court finds that the resumption of marital
relations is not reasonably probable.
Sec. 2:
The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interest of a
minor or dependent child with respect to his custody, support and visita-
tion. The court shall enter an order for costs, fees and disbursements in
favor of the child's attorney. The order shall be made against either or
both parents, except that, if the responsible party is indigent, the costs,
fees, and disbursements shall be borne as provided by rule of court.
Sec. 3:
If one of the parties has denied under oath or affirmation that the
parties have lived apart for the requisite period of time or has alleged that
reconciliation is reasonably probable, the court shall consider all relevant
factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to the filings of the
petition and the prospect of reconciliation, and shall:
(1) make a finding whether the parties have lived apart for the requi-
site period of time or not and whether the reconciliation of the parties to
the marriage is reasonably probable or not; or
(2) continue the matter for further hearing not less than 30 or more
than 60 days later, and may suggest to the parties that they seek counsel-
ing. At the adjourned hearing, the court shall make a finding whether the
parties have lived apart for the requisite period of time or not and
whether the reconciliation of the parties to the marriage is reasonably
probable or not.
"0s VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 751, 754 (1972).
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favor "no fault" living apart statutes they should, before
enacting them, study the "entire" system of divorce in their
respective states, and revise all the laws pertaining to the
divorce process to create a non-fault context in which the
living apart statutes might operate more effectively.
The present widespread practice of adding living apart
grounds to a fault system provides still another avenue for
the insertion of fault considerations by encouraging courts to
impose their notions of fault on this kind of legislation, much
as they do in connection with the incompatibility ground. 09
The classic instance, by all accounts, is that of North Caro-
lina."10 The North Carolina Statute provides that "marriages
may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the
bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if and
when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for
one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce
has resided in the State for a period of six months.""' By its
terms this statute permits divorce to either party without
regard to fault and without requiring mutuality of agreement
as to the separation. Yet the North Carolina courts have
construed the statute to require mutuality'"2 and to bar di-
vorce to the husband if he has wilfully abandoned his wife." '3
This bar can be raised by way of pleading it as an affirmative
defense." 4 Thus, a limited form of the recriminatory defense
is alive and well in North Carolina today to bar divorce on
this non-fault ground." 5
, See text at notes 70-75 supra.
,, See CLARK, supra note 4, at 353-54; Ploscowe, supra note 30, at 357; Wad-
lington, supra note 6, at 52.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1966).
12 Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961); 40 N.C.L. REV. 808
(1962). But cf. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).
"' See, -e.g., Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968); Eubanks
v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502,
146 S.E.2d 500 (1966); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
11 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); Overby
v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125
S.E.2d 373 (1962).
"' That this need not be the case is demonstrated by the experience of the
neighboring state of Virginia. Virginia's living apart statute is similar to that of
North Carolina. "A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed: . . . (9)
On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived
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The failure of "living apart" legislation to fully elimi-
nate distortions to the rational dissolution of dead marital
relationships points up the need for some other more com-
prehensive legislative approach to divorce reform.
3. The English Divorce Reform Act of 1969.
Unfortunately, the new comprehensive English Divorce
Reform Act"' does not provide the model our state legisla-
tures ought to emulate. Reform of the basic English divorce
system, which had not changed fundamentally since 1857,117
began promisingly enough with the report of the Archbishop
of Canterbury's Group in 1966 recommending that break-
down of the marriage be made the sole ground for divorce."'
The group also recommended that such marital breakdowns
should always be investigated by the court whether or not
the case was contested, in order to determine whether the
breakdown was irretrievable."9 The group's well-publicized
report was followed by unfavorable reaction from conserva-
separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for two
years." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91-(9) (Cum. Supp. 1972). But the statute also says,
inter alia, "A plea of res adjudicata or of recrimination with respect to any other
provision of this section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on
this ground; . . . Drawing from this language the strong intention of the Virginia
legislature to bar the introduction of fault considerations, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that the party of fault may be granted a divorce when
the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for the requisite period of time.
Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965); Mason v. Mason, 209 Va.
528, 165 S.E.2d 392 (1969). Moreover, a 1970 amendment to the Virginia statute
excluding the insanity of either party as a defense to a divorce action thereunder
clearly implies that mutual agreement to separate is not required. This amendment
in effect overruled Crittenden v. Crittenden, 210 Va. 76, 168 S.E.2d 115 (1969). Cf.
Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961). Such clear legislative draft-
ing is a rarity in this field.
US Divorce Reform Act of 1969, C. 55.
"7 The last major revision of English law prior to 1969, placed divorce jurisdic-
tion in the High Court and allowed as grounds, adultery, desertion for three years,
cruelty, incurable unsoundness of mind and the husband's commission of rape,
sodomy or bestiality. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1965, C. 72 § 1. The basic fault
defenses remained at least in theory but were limited in practice. Id. at § 5. See
Levin, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 MOD. L. REv. 632 (1970).
" REPORT OF ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S GROUP, PUTTING ASUNDER: A Di-
VORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1966).
.. Id. See Rowland, Matrimonial Law in England Today, 57 A.B.A.J. 981
(1971).
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tive quarters as well as a report of the British Law Commis-
sion challenging the practicality of the group's recommenda-
tions. 20
What followed in Parliament was compromise legisla-
tion which, while paying lip service to the concept of marital
breakdown, retains the ideas of fault and innocence to an
unfortunate degree. After boldly announcing in Section 1 of
the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 that irretrievable breakdown
was to be the sole ground for divorce, Parliament, in section
two, requires proof of such breakdown in the form of evidence
of adultery, cruelty, desertion or living apart for a prescribed
period of time. Only evidence of a living apart situation
would provide a basis for true no-fault divorce. In the other
three cases fault evidence is welcomed in determining mari-
tal breakdown. An anomaly created by the present statute
in requiring evidence of acts giving rise to former fault
grounds in establishing irretrievable breakdown is the in-
creased difficulty of obtaining a divorce under the new
reform Act. Under the predecessor statute, adultery, for in-
stance, was an absolute ground for divorce. Today, however,
the English petitioner would have to convince the court that
the respondent's act of adultery was symptomatic of break-
down. 2'
Moreover, an important non-fault basis for divorce
under the new act, that is, the living of the parties separate
and apart for a period of five years, 2 1 is compromised by the
provision of section four by which the respondent may op-
pose the grant of a divorce decree on the ground that the
dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial or
other hardship to him or her and that "in all the circumstan-
ces it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage."'2 3 Hardship
20 REPORT OF BRITISH LAW COMMISSION, REFORM OF THE GROUNDS OF DI-
VORCE-THE FIELDS OF CHOICE (1966).
"I See Levin, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 MOD. L. REv. 632, 634-35
(1970). It is Ms. Levin's hope that petitioners will be allowed to convince the court
of irretrievable breakdown on the basis of their own testimony. Id. at 639.
2 Divorce Reform Act of 1969, C. 55 § 2(1)(e).
2 Id. § 4. Decree to be refused in certain circumstances.
(1) The respondent to a petition for divorce in which the petitioner
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is defined as including the loss of the chance of acquiring any
benefit which the respondent might acquire if the marriage
were not dissolved.
These provisions smack of protection for the "innocent
spouse" against the "guilty one" who leaves his or her mari-
tal partner without consent. Such provisions in the new New
York statute might well have prevented Jackie Gleason from
obtaining his long sought-after divorce because it resulted in
the cutting off of Mrs. Gleason's statutory right to a widow's
share of Gleason's estate, a valuable right, indeed." 4 Thus,
section four of the English statute may prevent the decent
burial of some, though not necessarily all, dead marriages in
cases in which there is an absence of adultery, cruelty, deser-
tion or consent to living apart.2 5
An approach more consistent with the marital break-
down philosophy than section four would be to permit the
divorce, but require determination of the present value of
future contingent financial rights cut off by the divorce and
include that valuation in the property settlement. Such an
approach does appear to be possible under section six of the
alleges any such fact as mentioned in paragraph (e) of section 2(1) of this
Act may oppose the grant of a decree nisi on the ground the dissolution
of the marriage will result in grave financial or other hardship to him and
that it would in all the circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage.
(2) Where the grant of a decree nisi is opposed by virtue of this section,
then, -
(a) if the court is satisfied that the only fact mentioned in the said
section 2(1) on which the petitioner is entitled to rely in support of
his petition is that mentioned in the said paragraph (e), and
(b) if apart from this section it would grant a decree nisi, the court
shall consider all the circumstances, including the conduct of the
parties to the marriage and the interests of those parties and of any
children or other persons concerned, and if the court is of opinion
that the dissolution of the marriage will result in grave financial or
other hardship to the respondent and that it would in all the circum-
stances be wrong to dissolve the marriage it shall dismiss the peti-
tion.
(3) For the purposes of this section hardship shall include the loss of the
chance of acquiring any benefit which the respondent might acquire if the
marriage were not dissolved.
124 See Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
125 See Levin, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 MOD. L. REv. 632, 641-43 (1970)
for a trenchant analysis of this section.
1972-73] FERMENT IN DIVORCE
English Act which sets forth guidelines for the courts in pro-
tecting the financial interests of respondents in living apart
divorce actions.
26
While the English approach to marital breakdown is
generally questionable, the drafters should be commended
for expressly encouraging reconciliation efforts. Section three
requires the petitioner's solicitor to certify whether he has
discussed with the petitioner the possibility of reconciliation
and has given him or her information on how to contact
qualified marriage counselors. The section also empowers
the court to adjourn the proceedings for appropriate periods
to encourage reconciliation attempts if it appears the recon-
2I Id. at 645.
Financial protection for respondent in certain cases
(1) The following provisions of this section shall have effect where-
(a) The respondent to a petition for divorce in which the petitioner
alleged any such fact as is mentioned in paragraph (d) or (e) of
section 2(1) of this Act has applied to the Court under this section
for it to consider for the purposes of subsection (2) hereof the finan-
cial position of the respondent after the divorce; and
(b) a decree nisi of divorce has been granted on the petition and
the court has held that the only fact mentioned in the said section
2(1) on which the petition was entitled to rely in support of his
peitioner was that mentioned in the said paragraph (d) or (e).
(2) The court hearing an application by the respondent under this sec-
tion shall consider all the circumstances, including the age, health, con-
duct, earning capacity, financial resources and financial obligations of
each of the parties, and the financial position of the respondent as, having
regard to the divorce, it is likely to be after the death of the petitioner
should the petitioner die first; and notwithstanding anything in the fore-
going provisions of this Act but to subsection (3) of this section, the court
shall not make absolute the decree of divorce unless it is satisfied-
(a) that the petitioner should not be required to make any finan-
cial provisions for the respondent, or
(b) that the financial provision made by the petitioner for the res-
pondent is reasonable and fair or the best that can be made in the
circumstances.
(3) The court may if it thinks fit proceed without observing the require-
ments of subsection (2) of this section if-
(a) it appears that there are circumstances making it desirable
that the decree should be made absolute without delay, and
(b) the court has obtained a satisfactory undertaking from the pe-
titioner that he will make such financial provision for the respondent
as the court may approve.
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ciliation is reasonably possible.'27 The drafters also acted
wisely in expressly abolishing in section nine the old defenses
of recrimination, condonation, connivance and collusion.
B. LIBERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES AND PROPOSALS
The approaches to divorce reform just surveyed were
categorized as "conservative" because of their failure to
overhaul the fault system of divorce so as to eliminate all or
nearly all vestiges of fault or moral guilt in the grant of
divorce and the resolution of such collateral matters as prop-
erty settlement, alimony, child support and custody.
Most divorce reform legislation of recent years may be
characterized as conservative, but a handful of legislatures
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) have enacted or proposed sweeping
reforms which, if they do not completely eliminate fault from
divorce proceedings, go a very long way toward achieving
this end. We now proceed to a comparative analysis of what
we have chosen to term "liberal" divorce reform legislation
or proposals.
At the time of this writing, eight states have enacted
sweeping reform of their divorce laws: California,' 8 Colo-
rado,'29 Florida,'30 Iowa,'"' Kentucky,' 32 Michigan,' 3 Ne-
braska, 3 14 and Oregon.'3 5 Each of these states, to a greater or
lesser degree, has adopted what this study has come to call
a "pure" no-fault statute. In this context, by "pure" we
mean a statute which effects a thorough revision of both
I" See Levin, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, 33 MOD. L. REv. 632, 643-44 (1970)
for critical treatment of this section.
28 CAL. CiV. CODE § 4000-5138 (Supp. 1969).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-1 to 46-1-32 (Supp. 1972). It is important to note
that the Colorado statute and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, note 137
infra, are virtually identical.
" FLORIDA LAWS 1971, ch. 71-241.
,' IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1 to .34 (Supp. 1971).
13 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.130 (1972). The Kentucky statute is much like
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
'33 MIcHGAN LAWS 1971, P.A. 75.
134 Nebraska Legislative Bill 820. enacted July 6, 1972.
"' OREGON LAWS 1971, ch. 280.
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substantive and procedural divorce law by eliminating
grounds, reforming the initial pleadings, abolishing the com-
mon law defenses and reforming collateral proceedings.'36
In addition, a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA) 37 has been promulgated by the NCCUSL, but
American Bar Association approval of the Act was denied on
February 7, 1972.38 In setting out the UMDA, the National
Conference early concluded that
There is virtual unanimity as to the urgent need for basic reform
in both areas, not only of specific provisions but of the entire
conceptual structure. The traditional conception of divorce based
on fault has been singled out particularly, both as an ineffective
barrier to marriage dissolution which is regularly overcome by
perjury, thus promoting disrespect for the law and its processes,
and as an unfortunate device which adds to the bitterness and
hostility of divorce proceedings.13
One of the premises of this paper is that the UMDA
represents a distillation and codification of the best current
thought in American divorce law. With this in mind, this
section will set out the various state statutory mechanisms
by comparing their provisions with the corresponding por-
tions of the UMDA.
'11 Vermont, for example, has significantly changed its divorce law by now
permitting divorce whenever spouses can show that they have lived apart for six
months. VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-551(7) (1972). Because Vermont has not also modi-
fied the collateral areas of divorce, e.g., alimony, or eliminated the older fault
grounds, this article will not discuss it in the context of the "pure" nonfault stat-
utes.
7 The text, comments and some critical response from the American Bar
Association have been set out in 5 FAM. L.Q. 251 et seq. (1971). The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act will hereinafter be cited as UMDA.
'3 Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1972, at 2, cols. 1 & 2. Curiously, when the National
Conference was first founded in 1892 one of the first recommendations made to it
with respect to developing a uniform law involved a major revision of marriage and
divorce law. It took the National Conference eighty years to respond. Prefatory
Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAM. L.Q. 205 (1971).
"I Prefatory Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAM. L.Q. 206
(1971). The UMDA was five years in the drafting and is the work of a large number
of participants as well as separate boards of advisers and consultants. Professor
Robert Levy was selected as original reporter and Professor Herma Hill Kay was
later made co-reporter. Id. at 205.
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
1. Dissolution
The UMDA and the statute of every state listed above,
except Michigan, have abolished the adversary-styled cap-
tion in the pleading and require instead an in re-type caption
such as "in re the marriage of _ and _._"10 The
word "divorce" in every state statute, again with the excep-
tion of Michigan, has been eliminated and the term "dissolu-
tion" substituted. The thrust of these changes is to reduce
the adversary factor in the proceeding and to channel juridi-
cal thinking along the lines of partnership dissolution.
Concededly, these modifications are more stylistic than
substantive; but their ultimate effect should be to change
the focus of divorce actions from the opposing parties
("Smith against Smith") to the marriage itself-the "thing"
actually in controversy. A further beneficial effect should be
to inhibit the emotional aspects associated with the word
"divorce." 4'
Most of the negative commentary on present divorce law
has focused on the defects in the traditional grounds for di-
vorce.1 2 Professor Clark, for example, has noted that the
usual criticisms of divorce grounds may be summarized as
permitting the spouses "to obtain divorce by consent, but
subjects them to the humiliation, hypocrisy, sometimes per-
jury and needless hostility of having to testify to one of the
prescribed grounds-usually cruelty.' 4 3 A key reform in the
no-fault divorce statutes has been the abolition of all tradi-
tional grounds based on fault and the enactment of a single,
all-encompassing ground which purportedly lets the court
140 UMDA § 301.
14 Perhaps it is questionable that mere changes in language will effect any
long-range changes in public attitudes toward marital breakdown. The popular
press in California has not seen fit to grant across-the-board acceptance to the new
term "dissolution." See, e.g., Kasindorf, The Do-it-Yourself Divorce, 17 Los AN-
GELES MAGAZINE, May, 1972, at 52.
I See, e.g., Wadlington, supra note 6, at 32; Alexander, Let's Get the Embat-
tled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 98 (1953); Foster,
Current Trends in Divorce Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 21 (1967).




examine the "whole" marriage rather than forcing the court
to focus on a single, isolated act of misconduct.
The UMDA,'44 Colorado,' Florida,4 ' Kentucky,'47 and
Nebraska '1 s permit dissolution when the court finds the mar-
riage to be "irretrievably broken." Michigan'49 and Iowa' 9
allow dissolution when "there has been a breakdown of the
marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate ob-
jects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains
no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be pre-
served." California,'51 the first state to enact a sweeping no-
fault statute, and Oregon'52 sanction dissolution "when irre-
concilable differences between the parties have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage."
The original source of each of these phrases is clearly the
classic dictum of Chief Justice Traynor in DeBurgh v.
DeBurgh.5 3 What is not so clear, however, is the reason for
the selection of the particular phraseology by each state.
Michigan and Iowa have simply adopted the DeBurgh lan-
guage verbatim. The UMDA and Colorado statute, ex-
plained by the UMDA comments, assert that the choice of
"irretrievably broken" was done in this manner:
"Irretrievably broken" was chosen because this has become a
term of common use in the literature of divorce reform, and so
has gained a significant meaning upon which judges may rely for
UMDA § 302.
'4' COLO. REv. STAT. § 46-1-6(1)(c) (Supp. 1972).
,41 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-052 (Supp. 1972).
"' Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.130-4(1)(c) (1972).
48 Neb. Act (L.B. 820) § 1(1).
"4' MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.6(1) (Supp. 1972).
" IOWA REv. STAT. § 598.17 (Supp. 1972).
5 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1971).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (1971).
39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952). In DeBurgh Justice Traynor wrote:
In a divorce proceeding the court must consider not merely the'rights and
wrongs of the parties . ..but the public interest in the institution of
marriage. . . .[Wihen a marriage has failed and the family has ceased
to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served. . . .Public
policy does not discourage divorce where the relations between husband
and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
destroyed. Id. at 863-64, 250 P.2d at 601.
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guidance. It is closely related to the standard recently adopted
in California . . . and in Iowa . . . and equates to the doctrinal
result attained under the concept of incompatibility.54
By way of contrast, the California phrase apparently was
selected "simply because it is in fact descriptive of the frame
of mind of the spouses in a marriage which is no longer
viable."'55
While the problems of definition of the no-fault ground
will be dealt with at length later in this article,15 it is fair to
say here that none of these definitions is satisfactory in an
applied sense. Neither the reference to "literature," the
"frame of mind" test nor the DeBurgh quotation is suffi-
ciently descriptive and definitive to be of much value to
judges or practitioners.
Consistent with the trend toward abolition of grounds
has been the simultaneous abolition of the common law de-
fenses to divorce. Most obervers of American family law have
seen that the defenses have often been the hidden "kicker"
in many divorce actions. Even where grounds have been
painstakingly established, a defense properly interposed
may still prevent divorce. It may be said that the common
law defenses have caused as much psychological and social
harm as have the traditional grounds.
The UMDA, 157 Colorado,15 Florida,' 9 Kentucky,""° and
Oregon" 1 have expressly barred the common law defenses.
Iowa has expressly abolished only the defense of recrimina-
tion,12 and the California, Michigan and Nebraska acts con-
tain no express abolition.'63 However, California, prior to
,5' Comment, 5 FAM. L.Q. at 224.
, ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ASSEMBLY BILL No. 530 AND SEN-
ATE BILL No. 252 (The Family Law Act) (1969) at 5.
1" See text accompanying notes 302-10.
'5 UMDA § 303(e).
"8 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-7(5) (Supp. 1971).
'5' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-044 (Supp. 1972).
'" Kentucky has also abolished the defense of insanity. Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.150-5 (1972).
1" ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036 (1971).
662 IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.18 (Supp. 1972).
113 It is arguable that these last three states abolish the defenses by implica-
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1970, had codified the common law defenses as part of its
divorce law; and these statutory defenses were repealed by
enactment of the 1970 Family Law Act.' 4
The UMDA also abandons any requirement of a waiting
period for a decree following the establishment of its one
recognized ground for divorce. Assuming the state's resi-
dence period requirement is met, a spouse can obtain a di-
vorce as soon as the marriage is "irretrievably broken." And
while the Kentucky legislature made no change in the
UMDA in this regard,'69 the Colorado legislature chose to
impose a minimum ninety-day waiting period between
commencement of the action and entry of the dissolution
decree.'66 Some of the other states with sweeping no-fault
legislation have also imposed waiting periods of one type or
another. Iowa imposes a minimum ninety-day waiting period
which may be waived by the trial court on grounds of "emer-
gency or necessity.""'6 Nebraska requires a six-month wait-
ing period, but the trial court may waive this waiting period
if it determines that conciliation efforts have failed.'6 8 In
Florida no final judgment may be entered until at least
twenty days have elapsed from the date of filing the original
petition for dissolution. The court may waive this period on
a showing that "injustice would result" from delay.' 9 Cali-
fornia and Oregon take a somewhat different approach. Both
states may grant almost immediate interlocutory dissolution
decrees upon marital breakdown, assuming residence re-
quirements are met. But six months must elapse from the
date of service of process before an interlocutory decree can
become a final one in California.' 6 In Oregon the interlocu-
tion. While this is a questionable proposition at best, even if correct it is a substan-
tial defect given the need for thorough reform of the divorce laws. See the conclusion
of this article for a longer discussion of this assertion.
,' CAL. Cw. CODE § 111 (West 1954) (repealed 1970).
Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (1972) with UMDA § 302(a).
'" COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-6(1)(b).
,6, IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.19 (Supp. 1972).
168 Neb. Act (L.B. 820) § 17.
6 FLA. STAT. § 61.19 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
1,0 CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 1970).
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tory period is sixty days from the date the decree is ren-
dered."'
a. Evidence of misconduct
One of the more wretched aspects of current divorce
laws requires that the complaining party testify to specific
acts of spousal misconduct to establish the proper ground. In
practice, moreover, this requirement has led to both perjury
and pro forma recitals of "mental" cruelty. So strong, appar-
ently, is the average spouse's aversion to such testimony that
there is a pronounced "Gresham's Law" of divorce: that is,
spouses seeking divorce continually strive toward the least
distasteful ground on which divorce may be granted in the
easiest possible jurisdiction. Professor Max Rheinstein has
asserted that "whenever it is possible for divorce seekers to
obtain divorces with some difficulty in one place and with
greater ease or speed in another, cases tend to accumulate
in the place of the easy ... "72
The same phenomenon operates within a single jurisdic-
tion with respect to that jurisdiction's grounds. Easy grounds
tend to overwhelm difficult or distasteful grounds.'7 3 P. Ja-
cobson has found that the ground of cruelty, where available,
is easily the most popular. In 1950, for example, 58.7 percent
of all divorces granted in the United States were granted on
the ground of cruelty.7 7 The next most popular ground, de-
sertion, lagged far behind cruelty; 17.6 percent of all divorces
were granted on grounds of desertion.
7 5
The no-fault statutes in one fashion or another have
tried to mitigate the harm that flows from misconduct testi-
"7 ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.115(1) (1971).
172 Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VAND. L. REV. 633, 641 (1956).
173 For example, in New Mexico, a state with ten separate grounds for divorce,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 et. seq. (1953), almost ninety percent of the divorces are
granted on the single ground of incompatibility. P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE 126 (1959).




mony. Colorado,17 Iowa,' Kentucky,' and the UMDA 79 do
not expressly bar evidence of misconduct, but require the
parties to allege only that the marriage is "irretrievably bro-
ken." California""0 and Oregon'8' permit evidence of miscon-
duct to show irreconcilable differences. Michigan bars
allegations of misconduct in the pleadings by requiring that
the complaint "make no other explanation of the grounds for
divorce than by use of the statutory language."'8 2 Further-
more, the defendant in Michigan is also restricted and "may
either admit the grounds for divorce alleged or deny them
without further explanation.'
8I 3
The necessity for corroboration, another point of acri-
mony in conventional divorce, has been virtually eliminated
in most of the newer statutes. In six states, Michigan, Cali-
fornia, Oregon, Colorado, Kentucky, and Nebraska and also
under the UMDA there is no requirement of corroboration
whatsoever; and Florida requires corroboration only to show
proof of the residency requirement. 4 Iowa is the only state
with a no-fault statute that retains an express corroboration
requirement going to the proof of grounds.8 5
2. Alimony and Property Settlement
The financial aspects of divorce, except as they relate to
tax matters, have been singularly ignored in the legislation.
The UMDA is the first statute to provide both a no-fault
mechanism and a thorough re-working of the older property
and support concepts in divorce. Virtually every other act
simply superimposes a breakdown standard on the current
modes of spousal support and property distribution.8
176 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-7(2)(a) (Supp. 1971).
'" IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.17 (Supp. 1972).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.130-4(1)(c) (1972).
"' UMDA § 303(b).
' CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509 (West 1971).
ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.036(2).
' ' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.6(1).
183 Id. § 552.6(2).
"g FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-052(2) (Supp. 1972).
" IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.10 (Supp. 1972).
A leading discussion of alimony is a 1939 symposium which viewed alimony
from several different perspectives both legal and sociological. See Cooey, The
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a. Elimination of misconduct evidence
Colorado," 7 the UMDA,5 5 California'89 and Oregon""
expressly bar any evidence of specific misconduct in the pro-
ceedings bearing on property settlement or alimony. Ken-
tucky prohibits misconduct evidence in property settlement
but does not mention it regarding alimony.' However, the
Iowa Supreme Court recently held that the Iowa dissolution
statute does not permit the introduction of fault in either
alimony or property division disputes. 9 ' Florida, curiously
has retained an element of fault in its alimony provisions.
Under the new Florida statute a court "may consider the
adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in deter-
mining whether alimony shall be awarded . . . and the
amount of alimony, if any, to be rewarded . . . ,,.3 But
perhaps this new phrasing was regarded as an improve-
ment since the older statute prohibited an alimony award
entirely to an adulterous spouse.'94
b. Criteria for alimony awards and property
settlements
Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
213 (1939).
"' COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 46-1-14(2)(a) (alimony), 46-1-13(1)(a) (property set-
tlement).
UMDA §§ 307(a) (property), 308(b) (alimony).
"' CAL. CIr. CODE § 4509 (West 1971).
..0 ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.036(3) (1971).
, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190-1 (1972).
192 In re the Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972). The court
noted that the statute did not expressly bar fault even on the question of grounds.
It found, however, that the statute did not allow fault allegations in the petition
for dissolution and went on to conclude that such evidence should also be prohibited
in alimony and property questions. Of interest here is that the court found the most
persuasive sources for this proposition in the law review articles on the subject and
not in the Iowa statute's legislative history. Id. at 343-45.
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1972).
94 FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1967). It should also be noted that the Florida Supreme
Court has been extremely hostile to any constitutional arguments on this point. In
Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1971), a wife raised a due process and equal
protection argument on appeal contending that the statute does not single out any
other form of misconduct as a bar to alimony. Her authority was primarily made
up of citations to the Kinsey reports which the court summarily rejected, stating
the reports were "no justification for denying to the Florida Legislature a proper
exercise of its police power in an area as sensitive as the divorce laws." Id. at 780.
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Much of the existing legislation regulating the economic
consequences of divorce has been flawed by a lack of an
overall philosophy or coherent approach to the problem. Ali-
mony began as a means of supporting divorced wives who
were prohibited by the social barriers of the times from work-
ing and thereby supporting themselves." 5 The property divi-
sion statutes' grew out of a desire to ensure that when each
spouse has made a contribution to ownership of property or
owns the property outright, as from a separate inheritance,
that he or she would be able to retain that ownership.'97
However, as Professor H. Clark points out, courts have
tended to blur the distinction between alimony and property
settlements often with severe and perhaps unintended conse-
quences. Without proper labeling:
the method of enforcement and the existence of power to modify
the decree are at stake. Alimony orders are generally held modifi-
able and enforceable by contempt proceedings while property
orders are not. Alimony generally ends on the remarriage of the
wife, while property orders do not."'
With the exception of the Colorado and Kentucky ver-
sion of the UMDA, few of the no-fault statutes attack these
problems adequately. Michigan,'99 Oregon,"°9 Iowa, 01 Flor-
ida,1°1 and Nebraska'"3 merely permit such property division
or alimony awards as the court deems "just" or reasonable,
with no additional guidelines. The UMDA is the first of the
" See Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its
Present Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1939). It is purely statutory in
origin. Id. at 201.
"' The common law rule is that there may be no property division incident to
divorce without express statutory authority to do so. Griste v. Griste, 171 Ohio St.
160, 167 N.E.2d 924 (1960); Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958).
" See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 18 (1947): "Whenever a divorce is
granted, if it shall appear to the court that either party holds the title to property
equitably belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance thereof [to the
other spouse]."
", CLARK, supra note 4, at 449.
'" MICH. COMp. LAWS § 552.19 (Supp. 1972).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(e) (1971).
' IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.21 (Supp. 1972).
22 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(3) (Supp. 1972).
23 Neb. Act (L.B. 820) § 17.
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"pure" no-fault approaches to provide a reasoned and coher-
ent approach to the proper separation of alimony and prop-
erty division and statutory guidelines in both areas.
The UMDA comments strongly disfavor any award of
spousal support to either party when the property division is
adequate to provide maintenance.
Only if the available property is insufficient for the purpose and
if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure employ-
ment appropriate to his skills and interests or is occupied with
child care may an award of maintenance be ordered.2'
However, if spousal maintenance is dictated, the
UMDA, Colorado and Kentucky provide six criteria for the
award: (1) the financial resources of the party; (2) the time
necessary to acquire additional education or training; (3) the
standard of living; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the
age and health of the spouse; and (6) the ability of the obli-
gated spouse to pay.
205
California and Oregon also provide criteria for spousal
support similar to those of the UMDA. California permits
the court to examine "the circumstances of the respective
parties, including duration of the marriage, and the ability
of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment.
' °
"
Oregon provides eight criteria with the eighth factor stated
as "such other matters as the court shall deem relevant.
'" 2 07
The other states do not provide any criteria for an award
2 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 5 FAM. L.Q. 234 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 5 FAM.
L.Q.].
205 UMDA § 308(b)(1)-(6); COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-14(2)(a)-(g); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.200-1-2 (1972).
' CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (West 1970).
2 ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1) (1971). The other criteria are: (a) the duration
of the marriage, (b) the ages of the parties, (c) their health and conditions, (d) their
work experience and earning capacity, (e) their financial conditions, resources and
property rights, (f) the provisions of the decree relating to custody of the minor
children, (g) the ages, health and dependency conditions of the children.
Id. § 107.105(1)(a)-(g). We have been continually alert to these aspects of the new
statutes which may permit the intrusion of fault concepts in the litigation under
the new acts. Phrases such as the "other factors" language in the Oregon statute,
while used to broaden the court's inquiry may, in practice, permit the courts to
revert to traditional, fault-oriented thinking.
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beyond the "just" guideline which permits virtually unfet-
tered trial court discretion. Neither has any other state seen
fit to make alimony subordinate to property division by em-
phasizing property division as the preferred basis for gener-
ating income for the non-bread-winning spouse.
The property division provisions of the state statutes are
similarly brief and noncomprehensive. In California, a com-
munity property state, courts were permitted to direct an
unequal distribution of property upon a showing of fault. 08
Now the Family Law Act appears to compel an equal distri-
bution of property in every situation with minor excep-
tions.209 An equal division of property may, in most cases, be
completely justified; but this rigidity prevents the court from
looking to property division for spousal support in lieu of the
ultimately more damaging alimony payments.
Oregon,210 Iowa, 21 Michigan2 1 2 and Nebraska213 retain the
"just" or "equitable" standard. Florida appears not to dis-
tinguish property settlement from its alimony provisons.2 14 In
the 1971 case of Ferguson v. Ferguson,215 a trial court order
awarding installment alimony of one dollar per year and
"lump sum" alimony of the furnishings and a half-interest
in the family residence was affirmed.
Only the UMDA, Colorado and Kentucky statutes es-
tablish specific standards for property division. The thrust
of this portion of the Act as revealed by the comment indi-
cates that:
the distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage
10 Eslinger v. Eslinger, 47 Cal. 62 (1873). Unequal distribution was permitted
on a showing of either adultery or extreme cruelty.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1970): "The court shall ... divide the com-
munity property and quasi-community property equally." The exceptions are: (1)
the court may award "any asset" to one party if that award results in a "substan-
tially equal" division; (2) award whatever assets necessary to one party to offset a
misappropriation by the other party. Id.
'10 ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1)(e) (1971).
... IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.21 (Supp. 1972).
21 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.19 (Supp. 1972).
213 Neb. Act (L.B. 820) § 20(3).
2" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1972).
2 243 So. 2d 439 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
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should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of
assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." '
The UMDA takes a two step approach to property divi-
sion. First, the property is separated into marital and non-
marital property." 7 Following this initial separation the
court then has discretion to make a property division which
is "just" applying the following guidelines:
(1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as home-
maker;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
(3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the desira-
bility of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any chil-
dren.
218
The effect of this separation of property into "marital"
and separate portions is to insure that both spouses derive
some benefits from their acquisitions during marriage. It is
intended, for example, to permit the allocation of a portion
of the marital property to the spouse who is not employed in
a salaried position but has merely "kept house" during the
marriage. The statute clearly recognizes that the economic
contributions of a homemaker are as genuine as the contri-
bution of the wage-earner.
Moreover, the statute keeps purely independent acquisi-
tions or the proceeds of such acquisitions entirely out of the
marital pot. It recognizes that there can be considerable
emotional attachment to inheritances or gifts that are given
2,6 5 FAM. L.Q. at 207.
2,7 "Marital property is the residuum of all property acquired during the mar-
riage after the following classes of property are excluded:
(1) property acquired by gift or bequest;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before marriage;
(3) property acquired . . . after a decree of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
All other property is presumed to be marital property." UMDA §§ 307(b)(1)-(5),
307(c); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 46-1-13(2)(a)-(f), 46-1-13(3) (Supp. 1971).
218 UMDA § 307(a)(I)-(3); COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-13(1)(b)-(d) (Supp.
1971).
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only to one spouse. To lump this sort of property with the
joint purchases and acquisitions needlessly increases the
friction of property settlement during divorce.
Most importantly, the property division section of the
UMDA forces a commendable break with traditional prac-
tice by requiring the parties to look to presently owned pos-
sessions rather than future earnings for spousal mainte-
nance. Under the statute the property is divided in such a
way that it may provide the economic base necessary for one
spouse to begin a new life outside the family. Normally,
there will be no future wages committed by either spouse for
spousal maintenance. The economic ties which so distaste-
fully bind divorced couples under the alimony awards are
eliminated in many cases under the UMDA.
3. Child Custody
The history of child custody in Anglo-American law has
been a progression from a view of the child as mere property
of the father to a belief that the child has intrinsic worth
apart from that of his parents and, as such, has definite and
protectable interests of his own.219 The modern development
has been toward a test generally characterized as the "best
interests of the child." As Judge Cardozo formulated the
test:
[The court] does not proceed upon the theory that the peti-
tioner, whether father or mother, has cause of action against the
other or indeed against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do
what is best for the interest of the child. . . He is not adjudicat-
ing a controversy between adversary parties, to compose private
differences... Equity does not concern itself with such disputes
in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is for the child. 2
The best interests test has been subject to some modifi-
cation through the application of various presumptions. In
certain jurisdictions there is a presumption that a young
- See King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804); CL AK, supra
note 4.
220 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
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child is better off with his mother.2 2' When the dispute is
between a natural parent and a third party, there is almost
always a preference for a presumption in favor of the natural
parent.
222
Fault has long been a factor in custody disputes. Many
states have established a presumption of unfitness when one
parent, especially the mother, has engaged in adulterous
behavior.223 Other jurisdictions require that a mother who
has committed adultery be declared unfit as a matter of
law.24 It will be noted that this misconduct is not necessarily
misconduct bearing directly on the child (as in the case of a
mother who lets her child know of her adulterous behavior)
but can arguably be merely a single act of infidelity com-
pletely outside the child's knowledge but nonetheless suffi-
cient to provide grounds for the other spouse.2 1
5
a. Custody under the no-fault statutes
Every state statute, with the exception of Iowa and
Michigan, and the UMDA have incorporated, in some fash-
ion, the best interests tests.22 1 Iowa 22 and Michigan2 8 permit
221 Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216 (1963);
Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
2n See Foster & Freed, Child Custody, (Part I), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 425
(1964).
m2 See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960).
224 See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 108, 120 N.W.2d 585 (1963). However, it
is unclear from the Nebraska decisions whether a single, isolated act of adultery
will conclusively bar an award of custody to an adulterous spouse. The Nebraska
cases all involved a continuing, long-term adulterous relationship.
m In their classic article on child custody, Professors Foster and Freed note a
double standard in the custody area with respect to adultery. A mother's adultery
is usually a much more persuasive factor in a custody dispute than is a father's
adultery. Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Part I), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 431 (1964).
However, there appears to be a paucity of cases on this subject, perhaps because
an adulterous father rarely seeks custody as against a non-adulterous mother. It is
plain that a strong equal protection argument could be made in those cases where
the double standard is applied. It is equally clear that the equal rights amendment
will go far toward removing such inequities. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
648 (1972).
22B CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-24 (Supp.
1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (Supp. 1971); Neb. Act § 18; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 107.105 (1971); UMDA § 402.
22'7 IOWA REV. STAT. § 598.21 (Supp. 1972).
22 MICH. LAWS § 552.16 (Supp. 1972).
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custody awards within the court's discretion on any terms
which are "just and proper."
Beyond the basic test, however, several states have
adopted various little modifications and variations. For ex-
ample, California has set up a hierarchy, or order of prefer-
ence, in custody disputes which perpetuates the "preference
for the mother" presumption.2  Florida 3 ' and Oregon 23' have
expressly abolished the mother preference.
Colorado, 32 Kentucky233 and the UMDA 34 have set out
a non-exclusive list of factors within the general scope of the
best interest test which the court is required to consider.
As the UMDA comments indicate, this list is merely
intended:
to codify existing law in most jurisdictions. It simply states that
the trial court must look to a variety of factors to determine what
are the child's best interests. The five factors mentioned specifi-
"' CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1971);
Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child, but,
other things being equal, custody shall be given to the mother if the child
is of tender years.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in
a wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suita-
ble . ..
The same constitutional arguments based on equal protection and due process
which obtain when an adulterous mother but not an adulterous father is denied
custody are applicable here. The Supreme Court has already applied a due process
test to an Illinois proceeding in which fathers of illegitimate children were abso-
lutely prohibited from seeking custody of their children and were deemed unfit as
a matter of law. The Court held that this conclusive presumption violated an
"unwed father's" right to due process. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
'3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (Supp. 1971).
'a' ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(e) (1971).
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-24(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1971).
233 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (1972).
23. UMDA § 402(1)-(5). The factors are:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
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cally are those most commonly relied upon in the appellate opin-
ions, but the language of the section makes it clear that the judge
need not be limited to the factors specified.-
Several of the statutes, specifically California, 26 Colo-
rado,?37 Kentucky23 and the UMDA,3 9 prohibit any evidence
of fault except as such fault bears on the child itself. Oregon
has enacted a rather curious provision which permits the
court to examine the "past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties. '240 There is at least a possi-
bility that the broad language of the Oregon statute will lend
itself to considerable judicial abuse. To permit examination
of "past conduct and demonstrated moral standards" is to
almost beg for reinstatement of the old fault concepts and to
permit judges to examine virtually the entire gamut of one's
behavior. We may concede that some analysis of prior behav-
ior may be necessary to make an informed decision on paren-
tal fitness; but even an investigation of fitness should be
somewhat limited. The Oregon statutory language is so
broad that no limitations remain.
Furthermore, the Colorado-Kentucky-UMDA legisla-
tion incorporates some additional and provocative measures
which are generally considered by commentators to be bene-
ficial for the children. 241 This legislation permits consultation
with child care experts, 2 142 interviews with the child in cham-
bers rather than open court 2 3 and the appointment of sepa-
UMDA Comments, 5 FAM. L.Q. at 241.
u CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509(1) (West 1971).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-24(2) (Supp. 1971).
m Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (1972).
23' UMDA § 402.
240 ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036(2) (1971).
2,1 See, e.g., Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Fol-
lowing Divorce, 21 SYRACUASE L. REV. 55 (1969).
242 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-26(2); UMDA § 404(b); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.290 (1972). The court may seek the advice of professional personnel
whether or not they are employed on a regular basis by the court. The advice shall
be given in writing and shall be made available by the court to counsel upon
request. Counsel may call for cross-examination of any professional personnel con-
sulted by the court.
214 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-26(1) (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.290 (1972); UMDA § 404(a).
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rate counsel to see to the interests of the child independent
of counsel in the divorce proceedings. '44 Finally, as part of a
partial incorporation of what Dr. Andrew Watson has called
the "psychological best interests of the child" test, Colo-
rado, 45 Kentucky2 6 and the UMDA 4' prohibit any motion to
modify a custody decree within a specified period (UMDA 1
year; Colorado and Kentucky 2 years) after the entry of the
decree.
2 1
b. Extrajudicial resolution of alimony, prop-
erty settlement and child custody
Another salutary development-one which may ulti-
mately prove most effective in reducing the bitterness of
divorce-has been enacted by Nebraska, 249 Colorado, 5 ° Ken-
tucky, 2 ' and the UMDA. 25 2 A separate section of each of
these statutes permits the spouses to reach their own agree-
ment on property settlement, alimony and child custody out-
side the courtroom. The court may not set aside such an
agreement unless it finds the terms unconscionable-an ex-
tremely difficult task to be sure. The parties may stipulate
whether the agreement is to be incorporated into the final
decree of dissolution or merely "identified" in the decree. 253
244 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-16 (Supp. 1971); UMDA § 310. Kentucky has no
such provision.
245 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-31(1) (Supp. 1971).
244 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.340 (1972).
247 UMDA § 409(a). The UMDA also prohibits a subsequent motion to mod-
ify, whether the earlier motion was granted or denied within two years after disposi-
tion of the prior motion.
2,s 5 FAM. L.Q. at 247.
24I Neb. Act (L.B. 820) § 20.
210 COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-12 (Supp. 1971).
211 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180 (1972).
-2 UMDA § 306.
'1 This provision is such an unusual departure from the conventional settle-
ment language in most divorce statutes that its language bears quoting in toto from
the Kentucky provision:
(1) To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a
marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their mar-
riage, the parties may enter into a written separation agreement contain-
ing provisions for maintenance of either of them, disposition of any prop-
erty owned by either of them, and custody, support and visitation of their
children.
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Under these provisions, none of the problems which
arise collaterally to the divorce need ever be the subject of a
judicially-imposed settlement. Unless the spouses are so es-
tranged that they cannot communicate even through attor-
neys, each may bargain a settlement without fear that the
court will later upset it. The mutual give and take of negotia-
tion should produce a more mutually satisfactory solution
than a similar settlement imposed by judicial edict. Of
course, it may also sorely try the negotiating skills of the
respective counsel .
214
(2) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation,
the terms of the separation agreement, except those providing for the
custody, support, and visitation of children are binding upon the court
unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the par-
ties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own
motion or on request of the court, that the separation agreement is un-
conscionable.
(3) If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it may
request the parties to submit a revised separation agreement or may
make orders for the disposition of property, support, and maintenance.
(4) If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unconsciona-
ble as to support, maintenance, and property:
(a) Unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its
terms shall be set forth verbatim or incorporated by reference in the
decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be
ordered to perform them; or
(b) If the separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be
set forth in the decree, the decree shall identify the separation agree-
ment and state that the court has found the terms not unconsciona-
ble.
(5) Terms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by
remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt,
and are enforceable as contract terms.
(6) Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of
children, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of terms
if the separation agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms of a separation
agreement are automatically modified by modification of the decree.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.180 (1972).
"I One practicing attorney has, with tongue in cheek, envisioned a new breed
of "superlawyer" emerging from the intense demands placed on the negotiating
skills of the average family law practitioner by the new no-fault laws. The new skills
characteristic of the "superlawyers" will include:
(1) An insatiable curiosity for financial facts coupled with an ever-
present means for independently obtaining and verifying them;
(2) An unparalleled skill in a new science-which I call "conflict resolu-
tion"-otherwise known as negotiating skills equal to the proverbial
charming of the birds out of the trees;
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4. Counseling and Conciliation
One of the more divisive issues in no-fault divorce is the
specter, whether real or imagined, of the new statute permit-
ting divorce upon demand without any effort by the courts
to make some attempt to conciliate the spouse's differences
and thereby save the marriage. Perhaps no one has stated
this position with more force and vigor than the report of the
American Bar Association, Section of Family Law, in its
comments on the UMDA. The section believes that:
The failure of the proposed Uniform Act to provide counselling
or conciliation screening processes or services, the short period of
90 days continuance before a decree, and the "irretrievable
breakdown" ground, in combination, constitutes an abdication of
the public interest in the stability of marriage. There are no
meaningful brakes on impetuous or hasty divorce, no incentives
for second thoughts, and such is true regardless of children in the
family.255
While we do not subscribe to the Family Law Section's
attack on the irretrievable breakdown test, we do agree that
the UMDA is deficient in its failure to make detailed provi-
sion for counseling and conciliation services. But in fairness
to the drafters of the UMDA, it must be understood that
there are several unresolved issues presented by the idea of
a statutorily- established counseling or conciliation opera-
tion, which make the drafting of a model act for the various
states difficult. Should it be compulsory or voluntary? If
compulsory, how does one resolve the constitutional and psy-
chological problems raised by the mandatory nature of the
counseling? Given Jacobson's figure that approximately
ninety percent of all divorces are uncontested, 5 ' is there a
need for an elaborate counseling system for the small minor-
(3) A computerized mental agility plugged directly to the multitudi-
nous, prolix, involved sections of the Internal Revenue Code . . .
(4) The treasured. . . art of the ancient scrivener. . . who could weave
a web of words from which there is no escape in this life or in the next;
(5) The combined talents of a latterday Sigmund Freud, Ann Landers,
Dr. Spock, and friendly neighborhood bartender.
Ducanto, The Age of Aquarius and the Matrimonial Lawyer, 8 TRIAL 21 (1972).
255 5 FAM. L.Q. at 165.
2" P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 115 (1959).
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ity of cases requiring counseling, irrespective of the cost to
the taxpayers? Or should counseling be required in uncon-
tested cases? Should the counseling system be court-
connected or should spouses be referred by the courts to
private counselors?
The no-fault statutes already enacted have taken var-
ious approaches to the conciliation question. Colorado has no
established conciliation mechanism but simply advises that
the court may continue a proceeding for not less than 30 or
more than 60 days and "may suggest to the parties that they
seek counseling." '257 Florida makes counseling dependent on
both the court's discretion and whether there are minor chil-
dren involved and permits court referrals to private or reli-
gious counseling services. 58 Iowa permits the judge within
each judicial district to establish a court-supported counsel-
ing service through the county welfare board. 59 If such a
. COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-10(2)(C) (Supp. 1971).
258 (a) If there are no minor children of the marriage and if the
respondent does not deny [the petition] the court shall enter a judgment
of dissolution . . .if the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably
broken.
(b) Where there are minor children or where the respondent denies
[the petition] . . .the court may:
1. Order either or both parties to consult with a marriage coun-
selor, a psychologist or psychiatrist, a minister, priest, or rabbi, or
any other person deemed qualified by the court and acceptable to
the party or parties...
2. Continue the proceedings for a reasonable length of time not to
exceed three (3) months, to enable the parties themselves to effect
a reconciliation; or
3. Take such other action as may be in the best interests of the
parties and the minor children . ..FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(2)
(Supp. 1972).
' The Court shall require such parties to undergo conciliation for a
period of at least ninety days. . . .Such conciliation procedures may
include, but shall not be limited to, referrals to the domestic relations
division of the court, if established, public or private marriage counselors,
family service agencies, community health centers, physicians and cler-
gymen. . ..
The costs of any such conciliation procedures shall be paid by the parties;
however, if the court determines that such parties will be unable to pay
the costs . . . such costs may be paid from the court expense fund. IOWA
REV. STAT. § 598.16 (Supp. 1972).
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service is not established the court may use private counsel-
ing services. Moreover, the counseling appears to be manda-
tory and may not be waived if either party or the attorney
appointed to look after the child's interest objects.6 0
Michigan has tacked their no-fault provisions onto an
older counseling system which set up counseling services by
district under the various county boards of supervisors."6 '
The service functions under the circuit court's immediate
supervision with a mandatory "first priority" going to "do-
mestic relations action in which a complaint or motion has
been filed. .... "6 Additionally, the director of the counsel-
ing service may make referrals to outside services which are,
in his judgment, qualified to aid in reconciliation.113 There
appears to be no compulsory counseling requirement in the
statute; the initial referral from the court is apparently dis-
cretionary.
Nebraska requires, prior to any decree of dissolution,
that the court find that "every reasonable effort to effect
reconciliation has been made. ' 24 This statute provides for a
referral, at the discretion of the court, to a conciliation court
in those counties with such courts, or to independent coun-
selors where no conciliation court exists.265
Oregon permits each jurisdiction to establish a concilia-
tion service and, if established, the court may refer couples
to the service.2 6 But the statute imposes a severe time limi-
tation on the parties undergoing reconciliation by requiring
that conciliation be terminated and the dissolution proceed-
ing resume if there has been no reconciliation within 45
days.26 7
260 Id.
21, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.332 (1967).
262 Id. § 551.336.
263 Id. § 551.337.
264 Neb. Act (L.B. 820 § 14.
265 Id.
266 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 107.520, 107.540 (1971).
267 ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.540 reads, in pertinent part:
If within 45 days after the court commenced to exercise conciliation juris-
diction, a reconciliation or a settlement of the controversy has not been
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By far, California has established the most elaborate
system of reconcilation. As a part of the initial pleading the
petitioning spouse is directed to file a confidential question-
naire along with the petition.118 In those counties which have
established conciliation courts the questionnaire is served on
the other spouse along with the petition. 69 The document is
a relatively simple document asking 45 questions relating to
the spouses' personal background and the couple's marital
experiences. Question 44, for example, the item calling for
the most elaborate, free form response, asks "What do you
feel is wrong with this marriage?" 70 The questionnaire be-
comes especially meaningful when coupled with the elabo-
rate system of conciliation courts established in California. 7'
The Los Angeles Conciliation Court, the oldest member
of the 16 county system was established in 1939 and by 1971
had received a total of 72,692 petitions. 272 The court's profes-
sional staff presently consists of a director, an assistant
director and 13 Senior Family Counselors.27 It is difficult to
determine the ultimate effectiveness of the services fur-
nished by the court. In its latest annual report the court
indicates that it received 4,688 petitions for conciliation (in-
cluding 2,934 filed as a mandatory part of the dissolution
effected, the domestic relations suit shall proceed as if the court had not
exercised conciliation ...
... CAL. CIv. CODE § 4505(a) (West 1971).
269 Id. at § 4505(b).
210 FREEMAN, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW AcT PRACTICE 205-06 (1970).
Although only 16 counties presently have such courts, they are generally
viewed as desirable. Moreover, these 16 counties contain 70% of the population of
California. During the legislative proceedings leading to the enactment of the Fam-
ily Law Act, one of the more important questions raised was the cost of conciliation.
Another earlier bill had been proposed which would have established a state-wide
family court system complete with full-scale counseling. Cost of these services were
estimated at $4,400,000 statewide for the first year of operation. The presiding judge
of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Family Court Department, contradicted this
figure and estimated the total cost for one year at closer to $10,000,000. Krom,
California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAcIFic L.J. 156, 171
(1970).
22 THE Los ANGELES CONCILIATION COURT, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1972).
2 Id. It is important to note that the court not only treats foundering mar-
riages but also handles the premarital counseling for minors required by CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4101 (West Supp. 1971).
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proceedings under the Family Law Act).24 The court indi-
cates that where both parties presented themselves for coun-
seling 1,291 cases resulted in reconciliation and 512 remained
irreconcilable.2 5 Since it is generally conceded that few mar-
riages can be saved when one of the spouses refuses to subject
himself or herself to counseling, the percentage appears re-
spectable. It is at least arguable that the court saved a sizea-
ble number of marriages which might have gone under with-
out counseling. Whether the results justify the expenditures
is a matter for legislative consideration in the other states
and was a consideration weighing heavily on the California
legislature when it decided against requiring each county to




5. Short Term Effects of Liberal Legislation
While it is too early to make a fair appraisal of the
operation of sweeping divorce reform legislation on the order
of California's, some interesting short term effects should be
noted. These include speedier and more efficient divorce pro-
ceedings, reduction in migratory divorce, an increase divorce
rate, "do-it-yourself" divorce proceedings and the end to the
cathartic function performed by acrimonious divorces.
In California, at least, divorce proceedings have become
very streamlined and business-like. The entire process in
cases in which prior property settlement and custody agree-
ments have been entered into by the divorcing spouses may
take no more than ten minutes. Judges have been known to
handle twenty or more divorce cases in a day. 27 This can only
' 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 272, at 36 (Table I).
Id. Unfortunately there are no immediately available statistics on the num-
ber of dissolution petitions filed in Los Angeles County or on the number of dissolu-
tions actually granted. A combination of these figures along with the court's concili-
ation reports might provide a clearer picture of the relative worth of the conciliation
court. The conciliation court has reported also that the Family Law Act with its
mandatory questionnaire has caused an increase of approximately 15% in petitions
for counseling. Id. at 1.
,,' See note 264 supra.
" N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 1, at 62, col. 1. As one San Diego Superior
Court Judge put it, "Instead of screaming and name calling, we have a business
proposition that goes off fairly simple." Id. The speed with which these proceedings
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result in judicial economy and the reduction of court back-
logs, assuming that the divorce rate is not dramatically in-
creased by the reform legislation.
In the first full year of operation of new California law,
1970, the divorce rate did jump nearly forty percent. Those
who sponsored the law point out, however, that the major
share of the 1970 increase came about in the first three
months. 8 Persons who wanted divorces but might not have
been eligible for them under the old law, and those who
wished to avoid the hardships of the old fault system ob-
viously waited for the advent of the present non-fault sys-
tem. While a five percent decrease in the California divorce
rate was recorded in 1971,279 it can hardly be denied that
liberalized divorce legislation may result in the short run, at
least, in some increase in the divorce rate.
2
11
are carried on can be gauged by the experience of a member of Professor Zuckman's
summer 1972 family law course. He and his attorney pulled into a public parking
lot adjacent to the Los Angeles County Court House shortly before the time as-
signed for his hearing. The parking lot's rates are based on half-hourly time periods.
The two men left the car, entered the building, reported to a central trial assign-
ment room, obtained the information as to the location of their proceeding, went
to the room, sat through the opening ritual and two or three prior divorce proceed-
ings, had their proceeding (which lasted approximately two minutes), and then
claimed the car from the parking lot within the initial thirty minute period.
r's Id.
17 Judge William Hogoboom, a trial judge in the California Family Court
system, states that dissolution filings in Los Angeles County for the first full year
of operation of the Family Law Act increased 8.8 percent, but this filing increase
was roughly the same as the overall increase in other civil and criminal filings. In
1971, however, filings decreased by about 5 percent. Hogoboom, The California
Family Law Act of 1970: 18 Months Experience, 27 Mo. BAR J. 584, 588 (1971).
z Compare the New York, New Jersey, and Florida experiences following
liberalization of their respective divorce laws. After two years of operation of the
new law, effective January 1, 1968, the New York divorce rate more than tripled.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 4. Of course, it must be borne in mind that
because of its prior law restricting divorce to the ground of adultery, New York was
responsible for a very large number of the migratory divorces granted in Nevada,
Idaho, and Mexico. Regarding the new New Jersey divorce law, the New York
Times reported that between mid-September, 1971, and the end of January, 1972,
the New Jersey divorce rate had increased more than 100 percent and that the chief
clerk of the New Jersey Superior Court had expressed the hope that the increase
for the first full year of operation of the new law would stabilize at a level approxi-
mately fifty percent previously experienced. As with New York, the prior New
Jersey divorce statute was quite restrictive. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:34-2 (West
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If the divorce rate in a jurisdiction increases following
the advent of non-fault divorce, the migratory divorce rate
should decrease. Liberalized divorce at home destroys one of
the most compelling reasons for going to a foreign jurisdic-
tion, that is, the desire to evade strict local requirements.
This has proved to be the case in California where, prior to
the enactment of the Family Law Act, a substantial number
of Californians journeyed to Nevada for relatively quick and
easy divorces. But, in 1970, the number of Nevada divorce
decrees dropped approximately 15 percent and one Nevada
legislator estimated that the new California legislation is
costing his state one million dollars a year.2 1'
1952); N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 1, at 75, col. 7. On the other hand, Florida, which
had a relatively liberal fault system divorce law prior to its adoption of sweeping
non-fault divorce legislation, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041 et seq., (Supp. 1972),
experienced a relatively slight increase in its divorce rate during the first month of
operation-a time when the rate might be expected to soar, if it is to soar at all.
Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1971, § F, at 16, col. 3.
g I N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 1, at 62, col. 1. The Times' report is corrobor-
ated by a letter to the authors from a Nevada lawyer. He said:
Formerly, many California residents came to Nevada and established
residence here for the purposes of getting a divorce. . . Since the enact-
ment of the current California plan the number of Californians coming
to Nevada has greatly diminished.
Comment on questionnaire by William C. Thorton, Esq., Reno, Nevada. Question-
naire on file with authors.
One may hope that as liberalized divorce legislation becomes widespread, the
need of unhappy spouses to evade local law and, in the process, expend substantial
personal resources in an effort to dissolve their marriages will all but disappear. For
the moment, however, migratory divorce is alive and well in places like Haiti and
Santo Domingo. At about the same time that the Mexican federal government
outlawed quickie divorces in the state of Chihuahua, Haiti enacted a divorce law
much like Mexico's old law, permitting divorce upon grounds of incompatibility
without a showing of Haitian residence. All that is required is consent to the divorce
by both spouses and the personal appearance of the petitioning spouse. Because of
transportation schedules, an overnight stay at a Haitian hotel is necessary. One
American lawyer who previously practiced in Juarez, Mexico, has a virtual monop-
oly over Haitian divorces sought by residents of the United States. See Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 4; Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1971, § G, at 9, col. 1. Soon
after Haiti got into the migratory divorce business, the Dominican Republic sought
a piece of the action as well. Id. See also Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 1972, § A, at 18, col.
1 (editorial). The Post editorial attacked the present widespread fault system and
commended the California approach to nonfault divorce. It concluded by saying:
Washington area lawyers have recently been notified that a law firm in
the Dominican Republic has appointed a local representative to help
speed area residents to quick divorces. For $400, an airplane ticket, and
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A particularly fascinating effect of the new California
law and one that could have substantial impact on the prac-
tice of law is "do-it-yourself" divorce. Because the court
forms are so easy to fill out (to a great extent merely checking
boxes), and court procedures so streamlined, many Califor-
nians are availing themselves of the option to file for dissolu-
tion in proper person." 2 A Los Angeles County Superior
Court judge who supervises the court's family law depart-
ments has estimated that two percent of the filings in Los
Angeles County in 1971 were on a do-it-yourself basis.2"3 The
economies realized can be great. While California lawyers
charge a minimum of $350 for relatively uncomplicated dis-
solution actions pursuant to guidelines provided by the state
the right papers, you can get a divorce in Santo Domingo within 24 hours.
Unfortunately, you have to stay overnight because the first plane doesn't
reach the island until noon, and that is precisely when the divorce court
closes for the day. This sort of thing has gone on for a long time else-
where-the same law firm had an office just across the border in Mex-
ico-and it ought to stop. Something is wrong when people who have $400
and a plane ticket can get quickie divorces and those who don't have it
can't. No-fault divorce would be a step not only toward reality and ration-
ality, but also toward equality.
It is not yet clear whether Haitian and Dominican Republic divorces will be
recognized in American jurisdictions. A lively debate is now in progress. See Wall
Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 4. In response to a request for a legal opinion
regarding the foreign recognition problem made by the Haitian Agency, Inc. of
Hartford, Connecticut, a combination travel and divorce procurement agency, Don-
ald J. Cantor, a Hartford attorney, stated:
This procedure (of Haiti in divorce proceedings) is specifically patterned
after the law of the state of Chihuahua, Mexico which prevailed there
until November of 1970. My opinion, therefore, is that the present law in
Haiti, as amended June 28, 1971, provides a divorce for American resi-
dents which is as valid as that provided in the State of Chihuahua,
Mexico prior to November of 1970.
Letter to the Haitian Agency, Inc. from Donald J. Cantor, Esq., dated July 30, 1971.
This letter opinion was then circulated by the agency.
281 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, §1, at 62, col. 1; Kasindorf, The Do-It-
Yourself Divorce, 17 Los ANGELES MAG., May, 1972, at 52.
213 Kasindorf, The Do-It-Yourself Divorce, 17 Los ANGELES MAG., May, 1972,
at 52. This percentage may be on the rise. At the Van Nuys division of the Superior
Court on one day recently ten of the 23 dissolution filings were pro per filings. And
a radio report by WTOP-AM, Washington, D.C., a CBS affiliate, on October 23,
1972, stated that the clerk of the San Diego Superior Court had estimated that
fifteen percent of the approximately 12,000 annual filings for dissolution are now
of the do-it-yourself variety. The same report indicated that the pro per rate in Los
Angeles County had reached approximately eight percent.
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bar, the do-it-yourselfer can get a final decree in an uncon-
tested case for under fifty dollars which includes the fourty-
four dollar filing fee.2"4 Needless to say, the divorce lawyers
are less than over-joyed by this development."5
Finally, it should be noted that the availability of
speedy, efficient, and relatively cheap marriage dissolution
under the California approach is not without a hidden psy-
chological cost for the allegedly wronged spouse. The acri-
monious fault divorce proceeding could be used as catharsis
by the supposedly innocent spouse. The spleen could be
vented and perhaps some of the frustrations created by a bad
marriage worked off. This is no longer possible in the court-
rooms presided over by judges who understand the true na-
ture of liberal divorce reform legislation." 6 On balance, how-
ever, the loss of the cathartic effect of fault divorce seems a
small price to pay.
"I N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 1, at 62, col. 1; Kasindorf, The Do-It- Yourself
Divorce, 17 Los ANGELES MAG., May, 1972, at 52. One woman who went the do-it-
yourself route gives lay persons who wish to follow in her footsteps the following
advice:
If you want to do your own divorce, read everything you can pertaining
to the dissolution of marriage law. Go to the courthouse and sit in on
divorce hearings-both contested and uncontested. When your time
comes to testify you may antagonize and outrage the judge if you sound
like Elmer Fudd. On the other hand, he will probably be sympathetic and
downright courtly if you show you've taken the trouble to be well pre-
pared. . . .You must know what to expect in your own arena.
Cohen, Getting Through a Divorce for Under $50, 17 Los ANGELES, MAG., May,
1972, at 53. She further warns that the forms must be filled out perfectly or the
clerks, whom she found to be hostile to her pro per action, will reject the filing. Id.
"I Nevertheless, this movement has been nurtured by some members of the
California Bar. The do-it-yourselfer's bible is How to Do Your Own Divorce in
California, which was written by a Berkeley attorney, Charles Sherman. Several
thousand copies of the book have been sold. The Crenshaw Women's Center of Los
Angeles recently engaged a woman attorney to conduct a course for women on pro
per divorce procedure. Kasindorf, The Do-It-Yourself Divorce, 17 Los ANGELES
MAG., May, 1972, at 52.
"I Following a dissolution proceeding covered by the New York Times, the
Times' reporter asked the newly divorced parties what they thought of the proceed-
ings. They said, "It really was very painless and civilized." The wife found it too
impersonal and cold blooded. "I wanted a chance to tell the judge how hard I tried
to make our marriage succeed, and the anguish I went through before filing for
divorce." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 1, at 62, col. 1.
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C. RADICAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
The immediately preceding legislative enactments or
proposals are denominated "liberal" because while they
make fundamental changes in the prevailing fault system of
divorce they accept, at least sub silentio, the Western ideal
of the permanent and monogamous marriage contract, the
interest of the state in each marriage contracted, and the
monopoly of the state courts in dissolving the status of mar-
riage entered into through the present form of contract."7
Not all divorce reform proposals such as those discussed
below accept these fundamental tenets.
1. The Option Marriage Contract
For some time now, social scientists have been consider-
ing alternatives to the standardized permanent-exclusive
marriage contract. Dr. Jessie Bernard, a noted sociologist,
has recently pointed out that with divorce more readily
available to the mass of people, "the current trend seems to
be in the direction of commitment for only as long as the
relationship between the partners is a good one. ' 281 This
trend could be reflected in our legal system through legisla-
tion recognizing alternatives to the standard marriage con-
tract.
The most intriguing alternative may be the option mar-
riage contract similar to the old film industry option contract
for performers. Under this commitment, a marriage would be
entered into for a limited duration, for instance, five years.
If at the end of the commitment period one or both of the
spouses were dissatisfied with the relationship, the marriage
would be terminated without the need for court-ordered dis-
solution. If both parties were satisfied with their marriage,
each would pick up the other's option for another limited
period. Of course, some type of registration for terminated
contracts would have to be maintained by the state to give
notice of the parties' status to interested persons such as
"I For discussion of the state's monopoly in dissolving marriages, see Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
2m BERNARD, supra note 1, at 96.
[Vol. 12
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creditors. It is Dr. Bernard's belief that legal recognition of
this non-permanent form of marriage contract is not far off,
and she points to a bill introduced in the 1971 session of the
Maryland legislature designed to recognize such a contract.
This bill, 89 which to our knowledge, represents the first
serious legislative challenge in this country to the monopoly
of the standard marriage contract, provided that marriages
performed in Maryland "shall be a contract of marriage for
the term of three . . .years." 90 The bill died in committee
and, we think, with good reason. For as originally drafted,
the bill would substitute the monopoly of the option contract
for that of the standard lifetime contract. The monopoly
approach runs clearly counter to current sociological
thought."' The bill was revised and re-introduced in the 1973
session of the Maryland General Assembly. As it now reads,
the bill makes the option contract an alternative to the stan-
dard contract.292 As an alternative, the option contract would
"' (1971) H.B. No. 633 (Dels. Lee and Boswell).
29 Id. at § 1. See Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and Patterns of Divorce
Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 649, 661-63 (1972) for criticism of the bill.
"' See, e.g., BERNARD, supra note 1, at 270-71; Davids, New Family Norms, 8
TmAL 14 (1972).
"1 (1972) H.B. No. 3(Del. Lee) prefiled for 1973 legislative session. The bill now
provides:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland,
that new Section 32 be and it is hereby added to Article 16 of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland (1966 Replacement Volume), title "Chancery,"
to follow immediately after Section 31 thereof and to be under the new
subtitle "Marriage-Contractual Renewal," and to read as follows:
Marriage-Contractual Renewal
(A) The provisions of this section are in addition to the provisions
of law and of this state relating to divorce and annulment and shall be
construed as increasing, but not limiting, the law presently existing in
this state.
(B) Any marriage performed in this state from and after July 1,
1972, may be a contract of marriage for the term of three (3) years. The
contract at the end of that period of time shall be subject to renewal for
an additional three (3) year period upon the mutual agreement of both
parties thereto. The renewal option shall be available at the end of the
original three (3) year period and each and every three (3) year period
thereafter. If either party to the original marriage contract at the end of
the original term or any extension thereof does not agree to an additional
three (3) year optional extension to renew, and if the other agreeable
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have the advantage of providing the prospective spouses
with a choice between the supposed security of the standard
contract 93 and the freedom and independence of the option
contract. However, we doubt that such an approach would
be a step forward at the other end of the marital rainbow.
The option contract might be construed to require the par-
ties to be bound to each other during the option period re-
gardless of whether the marriage was then viable. 21' Thus,
party so requests, the Circuit Court of the County or Baltimore City, as
the case may be, whether either of the parties resides or works or main-
tains a principal place of business, has jurisdiction to determine:
(1) Alimony or maintenance, other support, if any, whether
pendente lite or permanent, payable by the spouse not renewing the
marriage contract to the person wishing to continue the marriage;
(2) Child support, if any, for issue born as a result of the initial
marriage contract or any renewal thereof or adopted by the parties
thereto during the original term or any renewal thereof;
(3) Property settlement between the parties to the initial mar-
riage contract or any renewal thereof;
(4) Any and all other questions which would be within the
jurisdiction of the appropriate court under the existing divorce and/or
annulment laws of the state; and
(5) Attorney's fees of the party applying for relief hereunder.
(C) The Court has the same powers under this section as it would
have under the laws of this state concerning divorce and annulment in
regard to enforcement of court offers issued under any application for
relief brought hereunder or by right under the divorce and annulment
laws of this state.
(D) If the parties to the contract, or either of them, do not wish
to continue the marriage for the original three year period, or any exten-
sion thereof, the party seeking relief or the other party to the contract
may request the Circuit Court of the County or of Baltimore City, as the
case may be, to proceed under the terms of the contract or under the
existing laws pertaining to divorce.
Any agreement signed by the parties to the original marriage con-
tract, with regard to alimony, maintenance and support, permanent or
pendente lite, or any of them, and child support, property settlement,
attorney fees, and other questions properly before the Court or within its
jurisdiction, or any of them, shall be incorporated in a decree or order of
the court.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, that this Act shall take effect
on July 1, 1973.
1 Compare, e.g., the status of the tenured university professor, who can be
removed from his position for grave cause only.
24 As a student commentator has observed:
A marriage should be legally terminated when its emotional underpin-
nings no longer exist, not when the state or the parties predict that those
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couples choosing this alternative might be deprived of re-
course to divorce in whatever form normally available in the
jurisdiction. Certainly, if recognition is accorded to the op-
tion marriage contract, the legislatures giving such recogni-
tion should make clear that the normal divorce process will
be available during the option period should it be found
necessary. 2
9 5
Moreover, because option contract legislation ap-
proaches marriage dissolution from a time perspective prior
to the individual marriage itself, permits automatic termina-
tion of significant relationships without regard to individual
circumstances, and has nothing whatever to say about exist-
ing fault patterns in collateral proceedings regarding ali-
mony, child support, property settlement and custody, we
would caution against its utilization as a substitute for broad
non-fault divorce reform legislation.
2. Divorce by Registration
By far the most radical proposal for direct divorce re-
form is divorce by registration. Either or both spouses would
register the fact that their marriage was in fact at an end.
The state would be stripped of its power of adjudication and
would be limited to recording and providing public notice of
the fact of dissolution. Of course, matters of property settle-
ment, alimony, child support and custody would still have
to be handled in collateral adjudicatory proceedings unless
the parties were able to enter into an agreement as to these
matters which might also be registered.
This approach to divorce directly recognizing consen-
underpinnings will-or should-have dissolved. A state imposed marital
contract of arbitrary duration provides no rational alternative to anti-
quated divorce laws.
Note, Untying The Knot: The Course and Patterns of Divorce Reform, 57 CORN-
ELL L. REV. 649, 663 (1972).
"' The original bill introduced in the Maryland legislature did not expressly
provide for divorce during the three year option period. The revised bill permits
spouses who do not wish to continue their marriage for the three year period to
dissolve the marriage "under the existing laws pertaining to divorce." (1972) H.B.
No. 3 § 1.
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sual or even unilateral divorce without state intervention is
politically unpalatable in this country 96 and we are unaware
of any serious legislative effort to reform existing divorce law
through this means, though the National Organization of
Women (NOW) has drafted a proposed bill which permits
divorce upon the filing of consent forms by both parties with
the county clerk.297
Politics aside, we reject this approach to divorce reform
because in its pure form it might encourage frivolous mar-
riages, and would certainly permit frivolous or thoughtless
divorces. And just as the present fault system errs in giving
too much weight to the state's interest in promoting a rea-
sonably stable society, permitting, for instance, the state to
snoop into the most intimate details of a couple's relation-
ship, the registration system errs in not recognizing any legit-
imate interest of the state in the marital relationship.
2 98
In its less than pristine form calling for a waiting period,
2U Even the very liberal Report of the California Governor's Commission on the
Family emphasized that the Commission was not recommending divorce by con-
sent. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 23 (1966). After a
brief experiment with it following the Russian Revolution, something resembling
registration divorce became as unpalatable in the Soviet Union as in the United
States. See G. FEIFER, JUSTICE IN MOSCOW 176 (1964); J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE
SOviET LEGAL SYSTEM, pt. 3, at 99-102 (1962).
"I The NOW Equal Right Divorce Reform Bill contains the following proposal
as the basis for dissolution of marriage:
Section 2.
(1) Proceedings for the declaration of the termination of marriage.
When both parties consent, by official written form, filed with the county
clerk's office in the county of either party's residence, to a termination
of their marriage, the court, after hearing, and finding that mutual con-
sent in fact exists, shall declare the marriage terminated.
(2) No marriage shall be terminated under this section unless both
parties appear in the proceeding and are present at the hearing.
(3) Proceedings under this section are not adversary actions be-
tween the parties to the marriage. There are no plaintiffs and defendants,
and the proceedings shall be considered and described as directed against
the existence of the marriage itself, and not as against a party thereto.
Unpublished notes on division of property and alimony compiled by Professor
Herma Hill Kay. Copy on file with authors.
"I For a contrasting view of divorce by registration in its pure form see Note,
Untying the Knot: The Course and Patterns of Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L.
REV. 649, 663-67 (1972).
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divorce registration provides the opportunity for some reflec-
tion and perhaps attempts at reconciliation by the spouses. 9
But essentially the same goal of thoughtful and business-like
divorce can be achieved by the utilization of a living apart
statute of short duration such as that of Vermont which, in
addition, recognizes the state's limited interest in marriage
by requiring a finding by the court that reconciliation of the
parties is not reasonably probable. 00
All in all, divorce by registration seems to be an idea
whose time has not yet come. Until there is a consensus that
the state has no interest whatsoever in the marital status of
its residents, the cause of divorce reform will be better
served, in our opinion, by liberal non-fault oriented legisla-
tion which recognizes that the state has a limited interest in
family stability.
We have examined all the new approaches to divorce in
the United States and we have concluded that there is a
definite and legitimate state interest in stable marriages, the
maintenance of the nuclear family and a smoothly function-
ing, minimally disruptive divorce procedure. Yet the state's
interest in these goals of stability need not take the form of
rigid ecclesiastical or authoritarian pronouncements-a set
of "thou shalt nots." It is perhaps enough that the state
maintain some contact with the institution of marriage and
the process of divorce, that it require compliance with cer-
tain minimal formalities both before one may marry and
before a married couple may dissolve their marriage much
in the same manner that the state currently prescribes rules
and procedures for the execution and probate of a will. The
formalities, and perhaps a waiting period of some short dura-
"' See the well thought out model statute proposed by Messrs. Goldstein and
Gitter providing for divorce by pro forma court petition six months after the appli-
cation for divorce is filed and after three months if the spouses have concluded
mutually satisfactory financial and custodial arrangements. Goldstein and Gitter,
On A bolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute & Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q.
75, 89-98 (1969).
30 P.A. No. 238, 1971 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. The state's interest in stability is
also furthered by the Vermont statute's provision for continuance of court proceed-
ings of up to 60 days to permit the parties to seek counseling. Id. at § 3. Portions
of the Vermont statute are set out in note 107 supra.
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tion before both marriage and divorce, should discourage
whimsical or precipitous action but not provide a stumbling
block to serious persons.
At the same time, we fully recognize that perhaps all
these requirements do not suit all persons who seek close,
marriage-like relationships without the permanence of tradi-
tional marriage. Exploration of these alternatives is not, of
course, within the scope of this article since we have,
throughout, accepted the basic premise of the validity and
continuing vitality of traditional marriage. We would merely
assert that a large body of opinion is engaged in full-scale
questioning of these postulates and that legislative drafts-
men will almost certainly have to cope also with these more
drastic alternatives.
III. THE REACTION OF THE ORGANIZED BAR TO
NON-FAULT DIVORCE THEORY
Legislative schemes such as the California Family Law
Act and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which wipe
away an entire system of law built up over hundreds of years,
are bound to have profound effect upon the practice of law
and the way attorneys earn their livelihood. This is particu-
larly the case when such reform legislation fosters an increas-
ing number of court filings in proper person."0 '
It could be expected, then, that the organized bar would
react strongly to the growing movement for non-fault divorce
reform legislation. At its 1972 mid-winter meeting, the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association had
before it for consideration two major matters in the area of
family law. One of these was a resolution endorsing the Uni-
form Abortion Act which, if adopted in a state, would permit
unrestricted abortion up to the 20th week of pregnancy. The
other was an endorsement of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act. 32 While liberalized abortion, an issue which has
troubled moral theologians, clergymen, doctors, lawyers
' See note 276 supra.
32 See 40 U.S.L.W. 2531 (Feb. 15, 1972); Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1972, § A, at 2,
col. 1.
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and legislators for centuries, was endorsed without debate by
the House of Delegates by an overwhelming voice vote,' 3 the
same body rejected the UMDA on a teller vote by the deci-
sive margin of 170 to 72.3o4
There was debate on the UMDA, with many of those
speaking strongly opposed either to the concept of non-fault
divorce or to the lack of definition of the basic test for the
dissolution of marriage, that is, irretrievable breakdown. 05
The unfavorable vote could have been predicted in light of
the opposition of the Family Law Section' 0
10 40 U.S.L.W. 2531 (Feb. 15, 1972). The day following the vote approving the
Uniform Abortion Act, E. Clinton Bamberger, dean of The Catholic University
School of Law and delegate of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
asked the House of Delegates to reconsider its action so that some debate might be
had on this troubling issue. This motion was quickly rejected. Id. at 2532.
Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1972, § A, at 2, col. 1.
Frederick G. Buesser, Jr., a Detroit lawyer, argued that the Act would
weaken the integrity of marriage and contribute to the disruption of marriage. He
noted with disapproval that the Act forbade taking gross misconduct into account
in granting a divorce. Ralph J. Podell, now a judge of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Circuit Court and chairman of the ABA Family Law Section stated that his section
opposed the Act as promulgated by the NCCUSL because of the lack of definition
for "irretrievably broken" and the lack of guidelines for the judge in resolving
whether a given marriage had so broken down that dissolution of it was proper. 40
U.S.L.W. 2531 (Feb. 15, 1972).
Both of these critical views were taken into account in the Family Law Sec-
tion's proposed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. See text at notes 285-
90 infra.
3" See note 298 supra. In a letter to the authors, Judge Eugene A. Burdick,
president of the NCCUSL commented on the opposition to the UMDA by Judge
Podell and the Family Law Section:
All of the objections raised by the Family Law Council and others
before the House of Delegates of the ABA were not only carefully consid-
ered by the Special Committee of the Conference which had primary
responsibility for drafting the Act, but were also reconsidered at the
special insistence of the Family Law Council. At the urging of the Family
Law Council, at least nine major points of critical objection were reconsi-
dered and as a result of which those relevant provisions of the Act were
revised. Only one critical objection of the Family Law Council was
rejected, namely the age of marriage without parental consent. The Fam-
ily Law Council wanted the age to be 21 years of age, and the Conference
steadfastly adhered to the age of 18 years as the age of majority without
parental consent.
In the light of the performance of acting chairman Ralph Podell of
the Family Law Section, it seems unlikely that the Family Law Council
would have unqualifiedly approved the Act even if the age of majority
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Following the ABA's rejection of the UMDA, a special
committee of the Family Law Section was formed to propose
a revision of the UMDA to the NCCUSL. A Proposed Re-
vised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act draft (hereinafter
referred to as the P.R. Draft) was adopted by the special
committee and endorsed by the Family Law Section in late
November, 1972.307
Throughout this paper we have used political, ideologi-
cal labels to categorize the various types of enacted or pro-
posed divorce reform legislation. Continuing in this vein,
while there is much that is liberal and progressive in the P.R.
Draft,38 the key provisions respecting the availability of di-
objection had been resolved in their direction. It is significant, however,
to note that the Family Law Section has stated in writing that it would
withdraw its objections to the Act if the National Conference would incor-
porate its comments on certain objectionable sections in the official com-
ments to the Act. This suggestion, of course, was totally unacceptable to
the National Conference as creating a precedent that would never end if
objecting bodies were given the opportunity to voice critical objections to
provisions of Conference Acts in the official comments of the National
Conference. The National Conference will indeed press for the enactment
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in state legislatures without the
ABA approval. There has been extensive journalistic support for the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act which has been critical of the failure of
the House of Delegates to approve the Act. I would not care to speculate
as to the chances of enactment without approval by the House of Dele-
gates. While we would prefer to have approval by the ABA and will
continue to seek it, the National Conference is autonomous and must
proceed to promote enactment of Uniform Acts which it adopts irrespec-
tive of a failure to obtain responsible endorsement.
Letters from Judge Eugene A. Burdick to Professor Harvey L. Zuckman, June 15,
1972. The authors have been unsuccessful in obtaining comment on Judge Bur-
dick's letter or a detailed explanation of the Family Law Section's position from
Judge Podell.
In providing the authors with a copy of the Proposed Revised Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act draft, Judge Podell cautioned that it had not yet been
considered by the Board of Governors of the ABA or the House of Delegates or the
NCCUSL. Letter from Judge Ralph J. Podell to Professor Harvey L. Zuckman,
November 29, 1972. Thus, the draft represented only the views of the Family Law
Section at the time this article was prepared. Revision or rejection of the Proposed
Revised Draft by the ABA is possible at either the ABA's 1973 mid-winter meeting
or 1973 summer meeting.
3w See, e.g., the detailed provisions concerning conciliation in §§ 302(3) and
305; the provision dealing with mandatory representation of the children's interests
respecting support, custody, and other matters by a court appointed attorney found
in § 310(a); the simplification of procedure in enforcing sister state support and
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vorce strike us as reactionary when compared to the Califor-
nia Family Law Act and the UMDA.
A major criticism leveled at the California and uniform
acts is their failure to define or set guidelines for the "irre-
concilable differences"30  or "irretrievable breakdown ' '310
tests for the grant of marital dissolution. While the lack of
definition and guidelines gives the courts flexibility in ap-
praising the status of marriages, '3 1' it does create some uncer-
tainty and may allow for arbitrary conduct by the courts.
If then there is to be definition, great care must be taken
in delineating the critical test, or reform will fail. The defini-
tional problem was the rock on which the English Divorce
Reform Act foundered .3 1  And it provided the opening for
turning back the clock in the P.R. Draft. Section 302(a) of
the draft, provides that the appropriate court shall enter a
decree of dissolution of marriage if, inter alia:
(2) the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken, which finding shall be established by proof (a) that the
parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more than
one year next preceding the commencement of this proceeding,
or (b) that such serious marital misconduct has occurred which
has so adversely affected the physical or mental health of the
maintenance decrees in § 311(a); and the provision for the impounding of court
records upon the reconciliation of the parties to protect their privacy in § 319.
' CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1972).
310 UMDA § 305.
... This lack of definition in the UMDA is not novel to uniform acts. The
commissioners avoided defining the concept of unconscionability in Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, though some very broad guidelines are provided in
Comment 1 to § 2-302. The apparent philosophy behind this reluctance to define
terms is that the courts should build the definition on a case by case basis and not
be hampered by legislative preconceptions. Moreover, it is very difficult to articu-
late such inherently amorphous but recognized concepts as unconscionability of
contracts and irretrievable breakdown of marriage. As Justice Stewart has said
relative to the definitional problem in controlling hard-core pornography, "I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibility doing so. But I know it when I see it .. " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (concurring opinion). And certainly, competent judges will also
know an irretrievably broken marriage when they see it.
"I See text at notes 118-21 supra.
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petitioning party as to make it impossible for the parties to con-
tinue the marital relation, and that reconciliation is improbable
The section confronts the petitioner with some difficult
choices: (1) living separate and apart for more than a year
before filing for dissolution, even if this will present eco-
nomic hardship; (2) going to Nevada for a "quickie" (but
expensive) divorce; or (3) attempting to obtain an almost
immediate dissolution in one's own jurisdiction by establish-
ing the "marital misconduct," that is, fault of the respon-
dent spouse and the impairment of one's own physical or
mental health.
Ignoring economic realities and the availability to some,
but not to others, of migratory divorce, the more than one
year living apart provision does not seem unpalatable. 3 3 But
these realities cannot be ignored. The old aphorism may not
be completely accurate, but two persons can live more
cheaply together, even if their marriage is dead, than two
persons forced to live separate and apart, while awaiting
dissolution. The P.R. Draft requirement may be a hardship
on the very poor. A provision that spouses may live separate
and apart while under the same roof would be somewhat
ameliorating here.314
The living apart requirement also engenders the need for
a proceeding to protect the financial interests of the spouses,
particularly the non-breadwinning spouses, during the sepa-
ration period. This proceeding is provided for in Section
317(a) and while such separate maintenance action may be
converted to an action of dissolution after the requisite pe-
riod of time has elapsed, the complexity of the litigation is
increased.
If one does not wish to wait more than a year to file for
3,3 The trend, however, appears to be toward a very short period of living
separate and apart. See, e.g., P.A. No. 238, [1971] Vt. Adj. Sess. Law, amending
VT. STAT. ANN. § 15-551(7) (six months).
3' The law is presently unsettled as to whether the living separate and apart
ground in many statutes is satisfied when the estranged couple continue to live
under the same roof. See PLOSCOWE, supra note 30, at 439-40.
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dissolution, he or she has two options. The first is to seek
dissolution in a jurisdiction where it is more immediately
available. To our minds any proposed legislation which en-
courages migratory divorce should be rejected. Migratory
divorce discriminates against those who cannot afford the
expense of traveling to another jurisdiction,3 '1 5 creates ethical
problems for the lawyer, fosters cynicism toward the law,
and encourages deception of the foreign court concerning the
issue of the petitioner's domicile." 6 This is not to mention
the legal confusion engendered if the home jurisdiction re-
fuses to recognize the foreign decree.
The alternative to migratory divorce is to play the old
and discredited fault game. One can file immediately for
divorce by alleging "serious marital misconduct" on the part
of one's spouse such as causes some substantial injury to
physical or mental health. Rather interestingly, no definition
is provided by the definition-conscious drafters of the term
''serious marital misconduct." But can there be much doubt
that when confronted with this phrase, the judges will equate
it to the old fault grounds and require a showing of adultery,
for instance? However, more than a showing of bare adultery
will be required. The petitioner will have to demonstrate also
that his or her physical or mental health has been so ad-
versely affected as to make it impossible for the parties to
continue to live together. Thus, whatever the form the mari-
tal misconduct takes, difficult questions of proof are intro-
duced into the proceedings concerning the state of the peti-
tioner's health and its relationship to the marital miscon-
duct. Even the presently existing fault system does not re-
"I Cf. Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 383-89 (1970) (concurring opinions of
Douglas and Brennan, J.J.).
"I R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS; CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
713-14 (1968). The counterargument that if the states adopted a uniform act on
marriage dissolution migratory divorce would be curtailed lacks substance. Does
anyone really believe that Nevada, for instance, would adopt an act which requires
residency for six or more months (P.R. Draft § 302(a)(1)) or that the governments
of Haiti and Santo Domingo will pull out of the "quickie divorce" market? The only
way to eliminate the evil of migratory divorce is to make marriage dissolution
almost immediately available in the home jurisdiction of those whose marriage has
in fact broken down.
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quire a showing of impaired health of the petitioner stem-
ming from an unfaithful spouse's adulterous behavior."' i
Compared with the California Act and UMDA, the net
effect of P.R. Draft § 302(a)(2) is to make the dissolution
process (1) more expensive and complex for the litigants, (2)
sociologically and psychologically unrealistic and distorting
of the judicial process insofar as it reintroduces fault into the
proceedings; and (3) generative at nearly every turn of more
business for the family law practitioner."'
Because of the regressive effects which will flow from the
P.R. Draft, it is hoped that the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws will reject the Family Law
Section's draft (if it is approved by the ABA) and remain
firm in its resolve to "press for the enactment of the Uniform
'I' Compare text at note 121 supra.
318 Separate maintenance proceedings under the living apart alternative, mi-
gratory divorce, and proof of fault and health status under the marital misconduct
alternative of § 302(a)(2) are not matters which can be handled by the layman.
Compare text at notes 256-59 supra.
There are other provisions of the Proposed Revised Draft which invite criticism
but which are not central to the dissolution process. Section 305(a) provides inter
alia that "no finding as to irretrievable breakdown of the marriage may be made
under § 302 of this Act until 3 months have elapsed after commencement of the
proceedings . . . " This is the so-called "cooling-off"' period provision designed to
prevent hasty divorce decrees. See comment to § 305. While its intent is laudatory,
its sweep is too broad. In cases where the appropriate court officer can immediately
certify that the parties have lived separate and apart for one or more years, or that
efforts at reconciliation would be impractical or not in the interests of the family a
"cooling-off" period is gratuitous and provision for its waiver should be made.
Section 306(b) of the UMDA states that the terms of the separation agreement,
except those providing for the support, custody and visitation of children, are
binding upon the court unless it finds that the separation agreement is unconscion-
able. The purpose of the UMDA is to "reduce the adversary trappings of marital
dissolution" by encouraging the parties to reach an amicable agreement among
themselves. This purpose is strengthened by the section making clear that the
terms are not to be interfered with by the court unless they are found to be uncons-
cionable. The standard of unconscionability here is similar to that under the Uni-
form Commercial Code § 2-302. Comment to UMDA § 306. Proposed Revised
Draft § 306(b) changes the emphasis on the court's role in overseeing agreements
made between the parties by stating that "the court shall examine the terms of any
separation agreement and if found to be fair and reasonable shall approve them
. . . ." This is a more affirmative statement of the court's power and may encour-
age unnecessary tampering by the court with the agreement worked out by the
parties.
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Marriage and Divorce Act in state legislatures without the
ABA approval.13 9 For the Commissioners to do otherwise
would surely result in a blunting of the first widespread
movement in this country for truly liberal comprehensive
divorce reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
In our discussion of the liberal statutory reform, we
made no secret of our strong preference for the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act as the prototype of a good, workable
no-fault divorce statute which still retains minimal state in-
terest and control. But research has shown us that not even
the UMDA is completely correct. It contains one or two de-
fects of major proportions-notably the lack of any counsel-
ing and conciliation mechanism.
Accordingly, we have isolated several factors, six, to be
exact, which are, or should be, incorporated in a satisfactory
no-fault statute. The basic premise underlying these factors
is that a no-fault statute must break sharply with past atti-
tudes and practices of divorce and yet retain at least a ves-
tige of state control.
To this extent, the simple change in wording from "di-
vorce" to "dissolution" is commendable. Any shift in lan-
guage which provokes a change in traditional juridical
thought on divorce should prove beneficial, if only to dis-
lodge the stodgy vestiges of the old fault notions. Except for
Michigan, every currently enacted no-fault statute does in-
clude this change.
32 1
However, we have distilled certain provisions which we
feel are essential to an adequate statute which are not to be
found in every statute we have examined.321 While we will
not burden this conclusion with lengthy comparative mate-
3, Letter from Judge Eugene 0. Burdick, President of the NCCUSL to Profes-
sor Harvey L. Zuckman, June 15, 1972.
32' See text at notes 140-41 supra.
321 See the discussion of statutory mechanisms generally in text at notes 241-
69 supra.
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rial to the extent that any statute lacks one or more of these
provisions, it may prove not entirely satisfactory in practice.
he six provisions are: (1) abolition of all grounds save
for a generalized ground such as "irretrievable breakdown";
(2) abolition of all common law defenses; (3) an express bar
on admission of evidence of marital misconduct except
where such conduct affects one's parental duties; (4) a provi-
sion which establishes some type of formal counseling and
conciliation either through private agencies or by govern-
mental action; (5) abolition of the various presumptions
which attach in child custody matters; and (6) revision of the
traditional notions of spousal support and property settle-




A generalized and rather vague ground which forces a
court to focus on the marriage rather than on isolated acts
of misconduct is essential to any reform of judicial thinking.
No-fault grounds grafted onto fault statutes or fault concepts
used as prima facie evidence of breakdown will inevitably
permit the reassertion of traditional judicial behavior. Only
when grounds and defenses are expressly abolished will
judges be compelled to look beyond those acts presently con-
stituting fault. While this type of inquiry may place severe
strains initially on judges formerly used to a pro forma exam-
ination of misconduct evidence, in the long run the general-
ized ground will surely provoke a more rational and mean-
ingful inquiry.
A significant backlash against a vague generalized
ground was noted in the American Bar Association's Section
of Family Law's comments on the UMDA.32 3 The opposition
to the single ground of "irretrievable breakdown" focused on
the lack of precision in such a term, and the consequent
problems of definition. While we do not agree with the
322 See text at notes 140-64 supra.




suggestion that the proper approach is to define breakdown
in terms of the fault concepts (cruelty, adultery, etc.), we
have found that this impreciseness is often unsettling to di-
vorcing couples as well as some attorneys.2" Apparently,
spouses, like judges and lawyers, have not yet grasped the
import of the no-fault theory. The underlying purpose of the
generalized ground is to require an inquiry into the relation-
ship between the spouses. The question must be not "who
did what," but "does the marriage presently exist as a via-
ble, functioning unit." Any definition, if a definition must be
attempted, should define breakdown in terms of a court's
personal observation of the integrity and viability of a given
marriage at the time of the dissolution proceedings. Once
separated from the false crutch of fault concepts, this deter-
mination, at second glance, is not overly hard to make. So
long as courts concentrate on the relationship between
spouses and the status of the marriage, breakdown will come
to be defined as the malfunctioning of the marital unit, not
as an instance of spousal misconduct.
Misconduct Evidence
32 5
Inquiry into specific acts of misconduct in dissolution
proceedings should be permitted only when child custody is
at issue and when a party's fitness as guardian is in question.
24 See one divorcee's comment on the California procedure at note 5 supra. We
are cognizant that with the ABA's Family Law Section having created an issue
regarding the meaning of "irretrievable breakdown," there may be political difficul-
ties in getting the various legislatures to adopt the NCCUSL or California style of
legislation. While we believe a definition to be unwise because, of necessity, it will
result in inclusion of marital situations inappropriate for dissolution and some
definition may be inescapable. In our view, the most palatable definition would be
one requiring that the couple be living separate and apart at the time the petition
for dissolution is filed. The definition should make clear that such living apart may
be accomplished even while the parties are residing under the same roof. Unlike
Proposed Revised Draft § 302(a), no period of time for living separate and apart
is required by this definition. The breaking off of marital relations is a step of such
consequence that it can with some degree of safety be taken to signify the break-
down of the marriage.
Should a legislature insist upon a time period for living separate and apart, it
is suggested that a three month period would be the least pernicious because its
encouragement of migratory divorce would be minimal. Compare note 274 supra.
2I See text at notes 180-87 supra.
1972-731
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
Application of evidence of misconduct to the purely financial
aspects of divorce is abused at best and grotesquely unfair
at worst. There is no rational explanation for Florida's incor-
poration of the provisions regarding an adulterous spouse's
right to alimony in its new statute.32 6 Such language can only
be explained in terms of the long-standing prejudices of the
members of the Florida legislature.
Even in custody proceedings, the issue of misconduct
must be delicately raised. As a culture we have moved be-
yond the attitude that adultery is a heinous offense against
both one's spouse and the state. Those statutory provisions
which conclusively bar custody to an adulterous parent (and
by long-standing practice especially to an adulterous
mother) unhappily preserve stereotypes rather than provoke
inquiry into true questions of fitness for custody. We do not
claim that misconduct is never to be an issue in custody
proceedings. We merely wish to see it relegated to its proper
place-a factor only when the misconduct has actually af-
fected one's relationship with the child.
Counseling and Conciliation37
While we strongly favor the UMDA as the proper ap-
proach to no-fault divorce, we are severely troubled by its
lack of any express counseling and conciliation procedures.
The state has a definite and identifiable interest in preserv-
ing marriages, and, as such, should not sponsor divorce re-
form without establishing a coordinate system of counseling.
Counseling need not be mandatory. It need not be provided
through a government agency. We recognize that there is
wide room for experimentation and diversity in this area.
Our contention is simply that a good no-fault statute will
incorporate some language at least recognizing the need for
counseling in many cases and providing some machinery
whereby counseling may be secured. If a state seeks to assert
its interest in marriage and divorce by prescribing plenary
methods for dissolution, it would appear to incur a coordi-
32 See text at note 186 supra.
See text at notes 241-69 supra.
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nate duty to establish some mechanism which seeks to help
troubled couples avoid divorce wherever possible.
The Presumptions in Child Custody28
In our discussion on custody, we have speculated at
some length on the possibility that the classic presumptions
which obtain in child custody matters (for example, the
"preference for the mother" doctrine) violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the federal constitution and will clearly
contravene the not-yet-ratified equal rights amendment.
Similarly, the presumption of fitness which attaches to the
natural parent as against a "stranger" is not wholly wise.2 9
There are numerous situations where a third party is an
eminently more suitable guardian than the natural parent.
We do not contend, of course, that these presumptions
are in substance inherently incorrect or that they lack a ra-
tional basis. The defect we have observed lies not in the
propriety of the idea of the presumption, but in the fact that
a presumption in the law tends to rise to the level of an
unassailable and incontrovertible truth. We find fault with
the raising of these concepts to the level of a presumption in
an extremely delicate area where stereotypes and precon-
ceived notions can be severely damaging to the child's fu-
ture. If there is a central truth in the area of child custody,
it is that each case must be treated as a unique entity and
must be dealt with as such by the court. Statutory presump-
tion may make the task of judging simpler by summarily
resolving custody disputes without reference to the specific
situation but they do nothing to insure that the child's best
interest will, in fact, be preserved.
Property Settlement, Alimony and Financial Discovery330
Too often courts have permitted extraneous considera-
tions to influence the financial aspects of divorce. Fault has
intervened; monetary awards have been used to "punish" an
, See text at notes 216-41 supra.
" See text at note 215 supra.
See text at notes 188-211 supra.
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errant spouse. The criteria for an award of spousal support
should be limited to an inquiry into that spouse's need. Prop-
erty settlement should be used as the primary device for
protecting a spouse from the potentially economically ruin-
ous consequences of a divorce, and alimony should be viewed
as merely a last resort mechanism for insuring such protec-
tion.33 ' Often regular and unremitting alimony payments
preserve ties which should be severed upon divorce. An une-
qual division of property in lieu of alimony, as unsettling as
it may sound initially, is highly preferable to perpetuation
of the bonds of a dissolved marriage through alimony pay-
ments.
The unfettered discretion of the trial court in alimony
matters should be terminated by incorporating in the statute
adequate guidelines for determining the award. 2 Too often,
courts are left with no standards other than the judge's own
intuition. The setting out of criteria, as in the UMDA, which
help direct his decision without framing the award in terms
of absolutes or "thou shalt nots" is essential to fair and con-
sistent resolution of financial matters.
Moreover, a statute should contain an adequate mecha-
nism for determining the true financial condition of each
spouse with some degree of certainty. Concealment of assets
has become a standard tactic in many jurisdictions. A good
no-fault statute should either establish its own discovery
mechanism or incorporate the discovery provisions of the
state's civil procedure rule (if sufficiently liberal). If these
methods are not adequately enlightening, a mandatory fin-
ancial questionnaire similar, in effect, to the confidential
questionnaire now used in California for counseling purposes
should be implemented. Anything less than full disclosure of
all resources is detrimental to a fair divorce proceeding.
Changes in the Profession
We have shown that the prevailing fault system places
severe strains in the lawyer's conduct vis-A-vis his ethical
' See text at note 197 supra.
32 See text at notes 197-200 supra.
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commitments. 33 The most important ethical reform neces-
sary if lawyers are to be permitted to be something more
than mere technicians, is the relaxing of the restrictions on
counseling of both spouses and the subsequent representa-
tion of one spouse at the dissolution proceedings. Such
change in ethical conduct is consistent with the rejection in
liberal non-fault statutes of the idea of adversariness. We do
not recommend that lawyers hold themselves out as mar-
riage counselors or that they engage in any form of in-depth
conciliation. Lawyers do not necessarily make good counsel-
ors. But, at the same time, an attorney should be permitted
to inquire sufficiently into the marriage (even if this inquiry
involves both spouses) to determine, to his satisfaction, the
possibility for reconciliation. The inquiry need not be exten-
sive but neither should it prejudice his representing one of
the spouses at a later date. To do so forces the lawyer to
choose between his own economic interest (the fee for repre-
senting a client) and his equally strong desire to abide by the
canons which urge him not to proceed with the divorce if
reconciliation is possible.
No-fault statutes in general are a salutary and long over-
due reform of the American law of divorce. In better reflect-
ing the sociological realities of marriage and divorce, the new
statutes will inevitably prove beneficial. Since none of the
more thoughtful statutes eliminate state involvement in
marriage and divorce entirely, they will still preserve the
limited governmental supervision necessary to preserve sta-
ble family systems in the United States. If we have found
defects in certain of the broad no-fault statutes, our com-
ments are intended as particularized criticisms of specific
statutory provisions and should not detract from our essen-
tial belief that no-fault divorce is both proper and necessary.
See note 36 supra.
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